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Aziz Z. Huq* 
 
Abstract 
 
The Constitution allocates entitlements to individuals and also institutions such as 
states and branches. It is familiar fare that individuals’ entitlements are routinely 
deployed not only as shields against unconstitutional action, but also as 
bargaining chips when negotiating with the state. By contrast, the possibility that 
branches and states could bargain over structural entitlements has largely 
escaped scholarly or judicial attention. Yet institutional negotiation over 
federalism and separation-of-powers interests is both endemic and unavoidable. 
To ascertain when such negotiation should be allowed, this Article develops a 
general theory of negotiated structural arrangements by leveraging doctrinal, 
economic and political theory insights. Negotiated structural outcomes, the 
Article concludes, should be deemed constitutional absent a clear demonstration 
of negative externalities or paternalism-warranting ‘internalities.’  
 
                                                 
*Assistant professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. I am very grateful to workshop participants at 
Duke Law School, amd in particular Curt Bradley, and the Chicago Junior Faculty workshop, for valuable 
feedback. Thanks to Steve Winkelman for terrific research assistance. All errors are mine alone.  
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Introduction 
 
 The Constitution vests individuals and institutions alike with 
entitlements. It is familiar fare that individuals can invoke those rights not 
only as shields, but also as chips in bargaining with the state. Accepting a 
plea bargain, negotiating a regulatory exaction to zoning rules, and 
accepting speech restrictions as a condition of government funding: All 
these are familiar deals with the state involving the trade of a constitutional 
right. A voluminous literature addresses the permissible scope of such deal 
making.1  
 
No parallel literature, however, explores the analogous possibility 
that institutions such as states or branches might bargain over their 
constitutional entitlements. The lacuna is puzzling. For individuals are 
hardly alone in striking constitutional deals. Consider how many landmarks 
of structural constitutionalism concern the results of bargaining over 
institutional interests: 
 
 Article I of the Constitution vests the executive with exclusive veto 
power over legislation.2 During the twentieth-century, presidents have 
repeatedly transferred to Congress a portion of that veto power in 
exchange for greater regulatory discussion, first over executive branch 
reorganizations, and then more generally.3 The practice ended in 1983 
only after high court intervention.4  
 In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted statutes singling out state 
officials to comply with administrative responsibilities set forth in 
federal statutes.5 Taking to the courts, states parried successfully by 
claiming an inalienable entitlement not to have administrative capacity 
                                                 
1 Classic treatments include RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); Seth 
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). These works are almost exclusively concerned with 
bargaining with individuals, not institutions. 
2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §7, cl.2. 
3 See infra text accompanying note 108. 
4 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924, 925A (provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act).   
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commandeered by federal law.6 Now, states cannot be commandeered, 
but they can trade that entitlement for federal funds.7  
 Congress is the constitutionally designated first mover on fiscal 
matters.8 But legislators face serious collective-action problems, 
rendering them prone to excessive deficit spending.9 In response, 
legislators attempted to bind themselves by directing the Comptroller 
General to sequester funds when the federal budget exceeded designated 
annualized ceilings.10 Delegating to the Comptroller General, Congress 
sought to alienate a portion of its Article I patrimony to an entity that 
could act without bicameralism and presentment—a novation found 
subsequently to violate the Constitution.11  
 
These examples are not outliers. Institutional deal-making populates the 
constitutional order as densely as trading over individual rights. Conditional 
spending enactments, cooperative federalism programs, and even 
preemptive legislation provide potent venues for federal-state exchange. 
Congress and the executive have also long experimented with diverse 
permutations of the law-making process, including the legislative veto, 
fiscal sequester mechanisms, line-item vetoes, and presidential budgeting. 
Institutional bargaining then is hardly the exception; it is often the rule. 
 
This Article presents a theory of institutional bargaining and its 
limits.12 The theory draws upon economic theories of bargaining between 
                                                 
6 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
7 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (endorsing the use of federal funds 
to“influence a State's legislative choices”). 
8 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, §7, cl.1. 
9 John F. Cogan, The Dispersion of Spending Authority and Federal Budget Deficits, in 
THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING 26–27 (John F. Cogan et al. 
eds., 1994). 
10 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
11 Id.  
12 Previous studies tend to focus on single federal authorities, such as the spending power, 
see, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after 
NFIB, 101 GEO. L. J. 861 (2013); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after 
Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995); Thomas McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional 
Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85; or the Eleventh 
Amendment, see Daniel Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 141 (1996), or commandeering doctrine, see Erin Ryan, Federalism at 
the ‘Cathedral’: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth 
Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,2 (2010) [hereinafter Ryan, 
‘Cathedral’]. A recent piece argues for “federalism bargaining” via secondary markets and 
auctions. F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Coase and the Constitution: A New Approach to Federalism, 
14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 593, 599–604 (2011). This proposal is both unnecessary (as 
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individuals to model the permissible space for institutional deals. The basic 
intuition is simply expressed. Private bargaining is typically viewed as 
augmenting social welfare through Pareto-efficient trades.13 The apotheosis 
of that perspective is the Coase theorem. This predicts that private parties 
will bargain to efficient results regardless of how the law assigns initial 
entitlements if transaction costs are zero.14 Of course, transaction costs are 
rarely zero. Initial allocations of rights15 and the law’s election between 
property and liability rules16 will often have welfare effects. Moreover, 
private law theorists have identified conditions under which bargaining 
should be prohibited via inalienability rules.17 Drawing on these law-and-
economic tools, as well as political science and doctrinal insights, I propose 
a default rule for structural constitutional deals and two circumstances in 
which the default can be overcome: Simply put, I argue that the outcomes 
of intermural bargaining should be immune from constitutional assault 
absent a substantiated concern about negative externalities or paternalism-
warranting internalities. 
 
 Institutional bearers of vested constitutional interest, to be sure, do 
not necessarily behave like individuals. It is thus not sufficient to translate 
in mechanical fashion the legal and normative frameworks for private 
bargaining to the institutional context. Rather, my aim in this study is to 
demonstrate—not to assume—that private bargaining provides a useful 
model for the structural constitutional context. As a threshold matter, we 
might note that some key differences between institutions and individuals 
                                                                                                                            
intermural bargains happen without markets or auctions) and implausible. The one more 
ambitious work I have identified is still narrowly focused on the scope of departmentalist 
interpretive authority. John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in 
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequences of Rational Choice in the Separation of 
Powers, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993). McGinnis’s useful work develops a 
powerful set of reasons for expecting that endogenous interbranch settlements by 
bargaining and accommodation will be pervasive, id. at 295–99, but does not develop an 
account of their proper boundaries. My account of bargaining not only rests on different 
normative grounds, but also identifies its limits. 
13 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521 (1945). 
14 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). 
15 For example, in incomplete contracts. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic 
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L. J. 729, 729 
n.1 (1992) (collecting citations to literature).  
16 A property rule means that property can only be transferred with the owner’s consent; a 
liability rule allows transfer without consent but with compensation determined by a third 
party. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972). 
17 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 931, 934-35 (1985). 
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render bargaining more salient for institutional than individual holders of 
constitutional entitlements. Branches of the federal government and states, 
unlike individuals, cannot exit from undesirable constitutional arrangements 
by physically departing a jurisdiction.18 Further, changing the constitutional 
dispensation through textual amendment is often practically impossible 
given Article V’s rigidity.19 At the same time, institutional bargaining might 
well have higher stakes than individual bargaining over constitutional 
entitlements. The Framers believed structural rules would be pivotal to the 
Constitution’s design.20 Negotiated compromises of architectural principles 
might undermine the Constitution’s central aims of fostering democratic 
accountability and producing national public goods.  
 
To date, scholars and jurists have employed either formalist or 
functionalist approaches to these structural constitutional problems.21 But 
neither formalist nor functionalist lenses has proved capable of generating 
stable, coherent solutions.22 Rather than seeking answers in inconclusive 
constitutional texts, open-ended historical evidence, or abstract conceptual 
analysis, the theory of intermural relations herein developed directs 
attention to a central mechanism through which institutions interact. By 
modeling this mechanism’s outcomes, the theory provides a simple, 
                                                 
18 See Adam Cox & Adam Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: 
Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 63 (2013) 
(“Exit generates unconstitutional conditions questions by making every government 
imposition at least nominally optional.”). State secession is now illegal. Texas v. White, 74 
U.S. 700, 724–25 (1869) (“What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more 
perfect, is not?”). 
19 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. -- (forthcoming 2014) 
[hereinafter “Huq, Function of Article V”]; see also infra text accompanying notes 220 to 
222.  
20 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(explaining that bills of rights “would contain various exceptions to powers which are not 
granted: and … would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted”). 
21 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000) (demonstrating historical equivocation between formalist 
and functionalist modes of analysis); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches 
to Separation-of-Powers Questions--A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 
(1987). 
22 Work by Elizabeth Magill in the separation-of-powers context is especially useful; her 
conceptual analyses of balance and structural equilibrium has obvious translation to the 
federalism context. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers 
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1194–97 (2000) [hereinafter “Magill, Real Separation”] (“We 
do not know what ‘balance’ means, and we do not know how it is achieved or 
maintained.”); accord M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of 
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001). 
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transubstantive framework for analyzing a wide spectrum of novel 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The study’s primary aim is accordingly to limn a general framework 
for dissecting structural constitutional dilemmas. That framework is perhaps 
most directly meant to illuminate and guide the behavior of political-branch 
actors taking frontline decisions about when to enter institutional bargains, 
and to facilitate public evaluation and criticism of “departmentalist” legal 
judgments underwriting intermural deals.23 The theory has secondary 
relevance to judicial doctrine. When officials decline to enter intermural 
deals, courts lack a justiciable controversy to resolve. Even when a deal is 
struck courts’ comparative epistemic weakness in predicting structural 
change’s effects undermine the case for broad judicial superintendence.24 
Exceptional judicial caution therefore should be exercised prior to 
invalidating a novel structural arrangement.  
 
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I defines the concept of 
‘bargaining’ for the purposes of my inquiry. It then summarizes the 
dominant theories of bargaining in private law. Turning to structural 
constitutionalism, Part II demonstrates the pervasiveness of institutional 
bargaining by documenting the practice in both separation of powers and 
federalism contexts. The ensuing taxonomy suggests that the Court’s 
current doctrine lacks coherence. The balance of the Article accordingly 
develops an alternative normative evaluation of the practice building on 
Coasean principles. First, Part III defends a positive default rule for 
institutional bargains parallel to the default rule used in the ordinary 
marketplace. Part IV then specifies two limiting conditions—externalities 
and paternalism-warranting internalities—also drawn by analogy from the 
private law context.25 In concluding, I reassess the role of judicial 
enforcement of this framework.  
                                                 
23 For studies of departmentalist practice, see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial 
Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of 
the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005).  
24 For skeptical treatments of judicial competence in structural constitutional questions, see, 
e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2013) 
[hereinafter “Huq, Standing”]; Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter “Huq, Removal”]. 
25 A threshold point about terminology: In this Article, I use the phrases intermural 
bargaining, institutional bargaining, and structural constitutional negotiation 
interchangeably to refer to the same phenomenon. Variation in vocabulary is employed for 
the purely stylistic reason of avoiding leaden prose. Unless otherwise noted, nothing except 
for stylistic felicity rests on my terminological election at any given instant. 
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I. Bargaining over Individual Entitlements in Public and Private 
Law  
 
 This Part defines bargaining for the purposes of this study. It 
explores how courts analyze bargaining over individual entitlements in both 
private and public law contexts. In both domains, bargaining is permitted 
absent an argument from externalities or paternalism. This intuition 
provides a potent starting point for analyzing structural constitutional deals.  
 
A. What is Bargaining?  
  
This Article is concerned with instances in which institutions 
actively negotiate the allocation of entitlements created by the Constitution. 
What, though, counts as a negotiated bargain over an entitlement, 
constitutional or otherwise? According to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, a bargain is “an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange 
a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”26 The 
Restatement elaborates that “a performance or a return promise [is] 
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and 
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”27 Bargains thus 
embody “reciprocal … inducement.”28  
 
In harmony with this approach, I focus here on a class of intermural 
bargains with the following characteristics: (1) a stable equilibrium (2) 
respecting the allocation of institutional authority between states or 
branches that (3) is the outcome of interbranch or intergovernmental 
negotiation between officials acting in their official capacity. This definition 
does not resolve all boundary disputes (e.g., how long must an institution 
endure before it counts as stable? when are officials acting in an official, as 
oppose to partisan capacity?). But it is sufficiently precise to pick out a 
class of phenomena—e.g., the line-item veto, the budget lockbox, and the 
office of the independent counsel—for the purpose of analysis here. 
Further, the definition is sufficiently capacious that it reaches both bargains 
that are instantiated in the form of law or regulations and bargains distilled 
                                                 
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981). 
27 Id. § 71. 
28 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (Dover Publications, Inc. 
1991) (1881); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981) (“In the 
typical bargain, the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive or 
inducement.”). 
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into informal or conventional agreements enforced through a tacit threat of 
future retaliation.29  
 
This definition seems to elide the possibility that institutions can be 
coerced such that an agreement should be ranked as involuntary. There is a 
large literature about coercion in both private and public law.30 Most of that 
work focuses on individuals rather than institutions.31 Its extension to 
institutions raises complex evaluative puzzles. For example, it is not 
immediately clear what it means to say that a corporate entity ‘feels’ 
coerced. Nor is it clear that there is any way of determining when an 
institution has been ‘wronged’ by a coordinate institution’s promise or 
threat, such that the latter counts as coercive.32 My argument does not 
depend on contestable claims about institutional psychology or the rights of 
corporate entities. Instead, I develop in what follows a broadly welfarist 
account of the boundaries to permissible bargains based on the likely effects 
of such bargaining upon values the Constitution aims to promote, including 
democratic accountability and the provision of national public goods.  
 
B. Individual Bargaining in Theory and Practice  
 
1. Bargaining in Private Law   
 
 In private law contexts, bargaining is typically viewed as a desirable 
mechanism for realizing social welfare gains. Starting with Ronald Coase, 
law and economics scholars have argued that a resource will be assigned to 
its highest value use via private ordering in the absence of transaction 
costs.33 “Assuming parties are rational,” the theory suggests, they will trade 
until a resource is assigned to its highest value use, and then “agre[e] upon 
                                                 
29 Cf. Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 295, 297 (1987). 
30 See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79 
(1981); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440 (Sidney 
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).  
31 For an exception, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional 
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L. J. 1 (2001). 
32 In recent work, Professor Berman has developed the possibility that institutions can be 
compelled, even if they lack the requisite psychological states to fairly be described as 
being coerced, because legal actors may have legal or moral duties toward institutions. See 
Mitchell N. Berman, Conditional Spending and the (General) Conditional Offer Puzzle 
(2013) (manuscript on file with author). Even if Berman’s claim about duties toward 
institutions is correct, I do not assume here any exogenously given account of such duties. 
Rather my aim is to develop that account from first principles.  
33 Coase, supra note 14, at 8; accord Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1097. 
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terms that maximize their joint surplus.”34 Given bargaining’s welfare 
enhancing effects, scholars posit that states should strive to create and 
administer property entitlements and enforcement regimes to facilitate 
bargaining.35 This often entails an inquiry into how law should craft 
interests—e.g., as property or liability rules36—to maximize welfare.37 In 
structural constitutional law, however, where most interests are protected 
with property rules rather than liability rules, this is not the best place to 
begin an inquiry.38 Instead, I propose starting with a second, more relevant 
line of private-law scholarship concerning the reasons for prohibiting 
bargains.39 That work provides a basic framework for thinking about the 
limits to autochthonic ordering in public law contexts. 
 
Within the dominant welfarist approach to private bargaining, limits 
to freedom of contracting are usually justified based on either the presence 
                                                 
34 Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
396, 397 (2009). 
35 For the classic statement, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making 
Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77, S95 (2011) [hereinafter “Merrill 
& Smith, Coasean Property”] (“[P]roperty rights assume the form they do in significant 
part to conserve on transaction costs.”). 
36 See supra note 16 (defining property rules and liability rules).  
37 See Ian Ayres, Valuing Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L. J. 881, 891 (2003) (“In 
models with incomplete information, the efficiency loss of choosing an inefficient rule can 
greatly exceed the nominal private costs of contracting around a default.”); Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L. J. 611, 624 (1989) 
(explaining that “the prime normative objective should be to minimize the sum of 
transaction costs and deadweight losses” due to insurmountable transaction costs). But see 
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or 
Failure?, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 834 (2003) (noting in the contract law context that 
“determinate models omit important variables, but including these variables makes them 
indeterminate, or, in some cases, unrealistic, because they place too great a burden on 
courts”).  
38 This is not to say that the choice between property and liability rules is irrelevant. For 
example, the Court’s commandeering doctrine might be understood as motivated by a 
preference for a property rule over a politically enforced liability rule. See Roderick Hills, 
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and 
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 817 (1998) [hereinafter “Hills, 
Cooperative Federalism”] (arguing that “the federal government should not confiscate the 
property or conscript the services of nonfederal governments … [but] should purchase such 
services through a voluntary intergovernmental agreement”). 
39 This is also a literature that examines non-welfarist justifications for limiting private 
bargaining. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907 
(1987) (developing a “personhood” theory of inalienability); accord Rose-Ackerman, 
supra note 17, at 932–33. Deontological values of the kind Radin marshals do not translate 
well into the institutional context.  
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of a negative externality or a recognized species of paternalism.40 First, 
“contracts are optimal … only if the contracting parties bear the full costs of 
their decisions and reap all the gains.”41 But when there are “adverse effects 
on third parties,” i.e., externalities, the presumption of optimality fails.42 
Under standard welfarist assumptions,43 the default response to an 
externality is to require the “internalizing [of] the externality through fees or 
taxes, [or] subsidizing the provision of information.”44 Mandatory terms are 
deployed only when these fail. For example, it has been argued that 
negative externalities can justify the absolute prohibitions of usury law, 
which prevents overconsumption of social security.45 Neither fees nor 
disclosure solve this externality. Only a mandatory rule will work.  
 
The second exception, paternalism, is a more fluid concept.46 
Loosely defined, paternalism is the law’s “intervention in a person’s 
                                                 
40 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1111–15 (also noting that distributional motives 
may lie behind asserted paternalistic reasons); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 938; 
accord Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 88 (1989). Michael Trebilcock offers a broader 
range of exceptions, but includes paternalism and externalities. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, 
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58–77, 147–163 (1993). 
41 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1436 (1989). Some scholars also point to distributive goals as justifications for limits 
on bargaining. See, e.g., id. at 1434 (noting the possibility that regulations can be 
mechanisms for “income transfer”). Distributive justifications can be reframed as concerns 
about the distribution of social power. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and 
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 571–72 (1982) (“The decision maker 
operating from distributive motives changes the groundrules so as to change the balance of 
power between the various groups in civil society.”). Even framed in terms of power, 
distributive arguments have no safe perch in the structural constitutional context absent 
some agreement about which institution needs empowerment.  
42 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, at 1436. Externalities can also be defined in 
relation to the competitive equilibrium resulting from a Walrasian auction. TREBILCOCK, 
supra note 40, at 59. 
43 I set aside here the hard question of what counts as an adverse externality in private law. 
See TREBILCOCK, supra note 40, at 61–64. 
44 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 938.  
45 Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 283 (1995). 
46 Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L. J. 763, 765 
(1983) (“It would be a mistake … to assume there is a single principle that best explains 
every paternalistic restriction in our law of contracts ….”). 
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freedom aimed at furthering her own good.”47 Its etiologies are diverse. 
Paternalists search for internalities, or “problems of self-control and errors 
in judgment that harm the people who make those very judgments. 
[I]nternalities … occur[r] when we make choices that injure our future 
selves.”48 A large literature mines behavioral law and economics for such 
internalities.49 Another related literature asks how individual preferences 
should be “laundered” to eliminate adaptive and otherwise distorted 
preferences.50 Obviously, paternalism arguments based on individual 
“human behavior” or “human error”51 cannot be directly transposed to the 
institutional context. Errors that infect individual decision-making may not 
occur in collective decision-making. Other internalities, however, do not 
rely on theories of human psychology. For example, paternalism in contract 
law may rest on accounts of second-order preferences, or preferences over 
preferences.52 Mutatis mutandi, the idea of second-order preferences might 
be extended to the institutional context. For example, an institutional 
interest held common by a group of individuals—say, several states or 
numerous legislators—might be degraded by free-riding. When a 
collectivity suffers from this sort of collective action dilemma, intervention 
might be justified to solve the ensuing ‘internality.’  
 
The private law approach to bargaining, in short, is simple. A 
permissible default position is combined with exclusionary rules when 
triggered by negative externalities and paternalism-warranting internalities.  
 
                                                 
47 Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 236 (1998); see also 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 40, at 147 (asking whether “parties present preferences” equate to 
“their own best interests”). 
48 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L. J. 1826, 1844–
45 (2013) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Behavioral Economics”]. One example is limits on cross-
collateralization in consumer contracts, barred because purchasers tend to discount their 
likelihood of default. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 139 (2013). 
49 For a summary of the relevant literature, see generally Sunstein, supra note 48, at 
passim; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).  
50 See Robert Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
THEORY 81–86 (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1989) (listing five potential grounds for 
laundering preferences). For a careful analysis of the relevance of adaptive preferences to 
rational-choice consequentialism, see Jon Elster, Sour grapes—utilitarianism and the 
genesis of wants, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 219 (A. Sen & B. Williams, eds. 1982).  
51 Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1832. 
52 Zamir, supra note 47, at 242. 
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2. Bargaining over Individual Constitutional Rights 
 
 Bargaining over constitutional rights raises issues absent from the 
private law context. Constitutional law is characterized by pervasive 
worries about government infringement on individual choice.53 Worries 
about unequal bargaining power that might be diffuse in the private 
contracting context54 come into crisp focus when one party’s wealth is 
sourced through taxes on the other party.55 Government also possesses a 
monopoly on the use of legitimate force that allows it to bargain not merely 
with dollars,56 but also under the shadow of licit coercion. Wielding either 
the purse or the sword, government can use its overwhelming resources to 
“divide and conquer”57 potential adversaries among civil society, thereby 
degrading important political liberties.  
 
Nevertheless, the basis framework developed in private-law contexts 
can be discerned in the complex jurisprudence concerning bargaining over 
individual rights. The Court has developed two sets of rules for noncriminal 
and criminal procedural rights respectively. In both domains, bargaining is 
generally permitted with exceptions roughly tracking the externalities and 
paternalism exceptions.  
 
Consider first the rules for noncriminal contexts. When government 
offers money in exchange for the exercise or nonexercise of a constitutional 
right (e.g., speech), it can purchase the latter in the same way it can buy any 
other good.58 Government thus routinely purchases private speech.59 It 
                                                 
53 This is the lesson of state action doctrine. Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State 
Action,” Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 
(1967) (“It is not too much to have said that the state action problem is the most important 
problem in American law.”).  
54 In economic terms, bargaining power depends on plural factors, including bargaining 
procedures, parties’ relative costs of delay and relative patience, outside options, and more. 
MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS 50–55 (1990).  
55 Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1296 (“The greatest force of a modern government lies in its 
power to regulate access to scarce resources.”). 
56 See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 
78 (Hans Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.) (1948). 
57 See Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 417, 426–27 (2010) (modeling divide and conquer strategies as, inter 
alia, a Stag Hunt game, and explaining how third-party bribes can yield suboptimal 
outcomes for participants). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) 
(plurality opinion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 (1991). 
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cannot, however, purchase supererogatory “conditions that seek to leverage 
funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”60 
This limit on contractual conditions might be explained by a worry about 
“the indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas” created 
when government buys out vocal participants through conditional 
funding—i.e., it is a limit motivated by concern about negative 
externalities.61 A different rule applies in Taking Clause cases. Imposing 
regulatory exactions, the state may extract only conditions with “an 
essential nexus and rough proportionality” to the “impacts of a proposed 
development.”62 The limit to regulatory takings is sometimes justified by 
vague grumbling about “extortionate” government action.63 It is more 
cogently explained by a concern that landowners as a group cannot resist 
government “extortio[n]” through the political process, because individually 
they are vulnerable to “divide and conquer” tactics.64 This is an argument 
from paternalism-warranting internalities.  
 
Different rules apply to bargaining over criminal procedure 
entitlements.65 The Court has tended to police “mistake or overt 
                                                                                                                            
59 This usually is addressed through the government speech doctrine. See, e.g., Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550 
(2005). Government can also effectively purchase the Fourth Amendment rights of 
government employees. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
Government likely cannot purchase religious observance.  
60 Agency for Intern. Development v. Alliance for Open Society Intern., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2321, 2328 (2013).  
61 David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in 
Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992). 
62 Koontz v. St Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013); accord Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825, 837 (1987).  
63 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2549–50. 
64 See Posner, Spier & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 426–27 (modeling divide and conquer 
strategies as, inter alia, a Stag Hunt game, and explaining how third-party bribes can yield 
suboptimal outcomes for participants). 
65 The regulation of bargaining over criminal penalties, however, must be distinguished 
from the possibility of unilateral waivers, which have become increasingly frequent. See, 
e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (Alito, J., plurality op.) (holding that 
suspects must expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment in noncustodial interrogations to 
preclude later use of silence in criminal trial); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 
2260 (2012) (holding in the context of post-Miranda silence that a defendant failed to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment right to cut off police questioning when he remained silent for 
two hours and 45 minutes). 
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deception”66 but otherwise assumes that pleas reflect Pareto-optimal 
compromises.67 Hence, threats by prosecutors to bring charges that would 
not otherwise be lodged render a plea “no less voluntary than any other 
bargained-for exchange.”68 Recent shifts in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, however, narrow that gap by imposing new obligations 
related to defense-side representation in plea bargaining.69 These new Sixth 
Amendment rules have been justified as correcting a flawed assumption that 
“good information” on defendants’ part generally enabled them to 
“rationally forecas[t] probabilities” of conviction and sentences.70 The new 
rules instead reflect the reality that defendants will rarely be fully informed, 
but rather plagued by internalities of “psychological biases and 
heuristics.”71 Hence, in the criminal context, like noncriminal contexts, 
constraints on bargaining with the state are grounded on internalities 
concerns.  
 
* * * 
 
This brief survey of bargaining over individual rights reveals a 
parallel basic architecture in both private and public law: An affirmative 
default rule is fenced in concerns about by third-party externalities and 
paternalism. In the institutional context, paternalist justifications include the 
desire to protect collective entities from their own inability to overcome the 
                                                 
66 William Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 763 (1989); 
see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619 (1998).  
67 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L. J. 1969, 1970–
71 (1992). 
68 Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (1987) (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 
508 (1984)). Criminal procedure rights are thus less protected than other rights. Rachel 
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1045–46 
(2006).  
69 See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
can be violated by counsel’s advice to reject a plea deal if a trial leads to a worse outcome); 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has 
the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and 
conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1478 (2010) (requiring advice about the immigration consequences of pleas).  
70 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2011).  
71 Id. Another internalities-based argument against plea bargaining suggests that 
prosecutors exploit a collective action problem among defendants to secure convictions on 
charges defendants would never have faced in the first instance. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri 
Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737, 743 
(2009). 
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transaction costs of group action. The question now is whether these basic 
insights can be translated over to the structural constitutionalism context.  
II. The Varieties of Institutional Bargaining 
 
The Constitution vests a rich menu of institutional entitlements in 
the branches of the federal government and the several states. Dynamic 
interaction between these institutions creates opportunities for bargains in 
which an entitlement held initially by one institution is voluntarily 
transferred to another institution to realize a policy benefit. Intermural 
bargaining occurs between Congress and the executive over elements of the 
national lawmaking process. States and the federal government, by contrast, 
negotiate over regulatory jurisdiction (i.e., the power to set rules for a 
certain population) and the enforcement-related infrastructure. By 
taxonomizing observed bargains, this Part demonstrates that voluntary deal-
making over institutional entitlements is a pervasive feature of the current 
constitutional dispensation. This motivates the normative analysis of Parts 
III and IV.  
 
A. Bargaining Between Branches  
 
1. The Constitution’s Allocation of Lawmaking Interests  
 
 Article I of the Constitution partitions lawmaking power between 
the two Houses of Congress—each has the right to a separate vote on a 
bill—and the President—he or she has the right to sign, veto, or pocket veto 
that enrolled bill.72 Article II contains no explicit grant of legislative-like 
authorities73 (although presidents do exercise de facto decree power74). This 
asymmetry is amplified in the fiscal domain. To begin with, revenue-raising 
measures must “originate” in the House of Representatives, not the 
Senate.75 Executive fiscal authority is also tightly limited. Absent an 
                                                 
72 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §7, cl.2. 
73 Where the President’s constitutional authority seems at an apogee, the Constitution’s text 
cuts in the other direction. Hence, even if the President is “Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.1, Congress still can make 
“Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” Art. I, §8, cl.14. 
74 See Brian R. Sala, In Search of the Administrative President: Presidential ‘Decree’ 
Powers and Policy Implementation in the United States, in EXECUTIVE DECREE 
AUTHORITY 254-73 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1998). 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl.1. 
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“[a]ppropriato[n] made by Law,” the Treasury cannot disburse funds.76 
Military appropriations also cannot last more than two years.77 The 
Constitution thus reposes the “‘power of the purse’ … in the Congress” 
alone, with particular care to ensure legislative control over military power 
that (to eighteenth-century eyes) might provide a basis for plenary executive 
control.78 Pursuant to this authority, Congress created in 1974 a complex set 
of procedures79 for discretionary and direct spending organized around its 
longstanding committee structures.80 
 
What the Constitution proposes, though, politicians dispose. 
Observed deviations from the text’s modular disposition are typically 
“consensual arrangements among the branches, not unilateral action by one 
branch.”81 When these deals are challenged in federal court, the ensuing 
jurisprudence illuminates the landscape of interbranch bargaining over 
structural entitlements.82 
  
2. Bargaining over Rulemaking Authority 
 
 For more than a century after the Constitution’s ratification, the 
textual division of law-making authority between Congress and the 
President endured without much controversy. As late as 1892, the Supreme 
                                                 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl.7 (also requiring regular publication of “a regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money”); see also 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341(a), 1350 (2006) (imposing criminal penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment 
and $5,000 in fines upon federal officials engaging in the knowing expenditure of funds 
absent a legislative appropriation). The President’s authority to issue new debt is 
constrained by statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing the statutory 
debt limit), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240. 
77 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl.12. 
78 Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 278 
(1977). 
79 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 
Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 and 31 U.S.C.). 
80 See Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 
GEO. L. J. 1555, 1563, 1568–80 (2007) (describing current congressional budgeting 
structures). 
81 Jacob R. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 356 (2010). 
82 In addition to the species of bargaining discussed below, it is possible to think of statutes 
amending the House’s or the Senate’s internal procedures as an interbranch bargain. 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, 
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346–47 
(2003) (describing “statutized rules”). Bruhl analyzes these bargains in light of 
entrenchment concerns. Id. at 372–76 (anticipating my analysis of negative externalities); 
see infra Part IV.A. 
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Court could assume that no interbranch delegation of such legislative 
authority was permissible.83 An “intelligible principle” was required to 
guide any exercise of executive branch discretion.84 Although the Court 
permitted executive clarification of statutes through rulemaking by the early 
twentieth century,85 it remained committed to the nondelegation doctrine. In 
1935, the Justices invalidated two early New Deal regulatory regimes on 
nondelegation grounds.86 In effect, Article I entitlements were protected 
with an inalienability rule.  
 
Since 1935, however, the Court has permitted Congress and the 
executive to negotiate broad delegations of rulemaking authority to federal 
administrative agencies. Delegation is now “the dynamo of modern 
government.”87 The political branches conspire in “virtually complete 
abandonment” of nondelegation constraints.88 Even scholars critical of this 
development perceive “no serious real-world legal or political challenges” 
to it.89 Now, “there just is no constitutional nondelegation rule” and 
whispers thereof are “nothing more than a local aberration.”90 As a result, 
“[t]he bulk of our federal law now derives from agency rules, guidances, 
opinion letters, manuals, and websites.”91 Litigated efforts to rekindle the 
nondelegation doctrine sputter.92 In a limited number of cases, to be sure, 
                                                 
83 Marshall Field & Co v Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That congress cannot delegate 
legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.”). 
84 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
85 See, e.g., United States v Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (“(T)he authority to make 
administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power.”). 
86 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
87 LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 33 (1965). 
88 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1241 (1994). 
89 Id. Justice Thomas, however, has indicated his willingness to “reconsider [the Court’s] 
precedents on cessions of legislative power.” Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
90 Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1721, 1722 (2002). 
91 Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1727, 1730 (2010); accord Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 
41 DUKE L. J. 1463, 1469 (1992). 
92 See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222–23 (1989) (finding 
“no support . . . for [the] contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of 
Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases 
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the Court imposes “nondelegation canons,” but these tend to enforce 
discrete values such as federalism and individual rights external to Article 
I.93 What once was subject to an inalienability rule is now regulated through 
a property rule.94 
 
The ensuing transfer of Article I authority was amplified in 1983 
with Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the 
Court invoked expertise and democratic accountability grounds to defer to 
some executive-branch interpretations of ambiguous statutes.95 Provided a 
statute adequately signals congressional intent to vest the executive with 
gap-filling authority, delegation is packaged post-Chevron with new-rule-
making authority.96 Indeed, even a “general delegation to the agency to 
administer the statute will often satisfy the court that Congress has 
delegated interpretive authority over the ambiguity at issue.”97 Chevron 
deference matters here because one important way for Congress to control 
ex post executive branch policy-making is by constructing “fire alarms for 
constituents to sound when wronged by bureaucrats…. Congress gives 
private groups standing to challenge administrative decisions.”98 Judicial 
deference to agency interpretations renders this strategy less effective. 
Courts operating within a deferential regime are less likely to heed “fire 
alarms” sounded by private citizens. Chevron therefore not only transfers 
                                                                                                                            
where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing 
power”); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (same for criminal statutes). 
93 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
94 When Congress overrides a presidential veto to delegate authority to the federal 
government, it is hard to describe the outcome as consensual. Delegation instead is a 
(legitimately) forced transfer.  
95 467 U.S. 837, 843, 865 (1984) (arguing that because “[j]udges are not experts in the 
field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government,” they should defer to 
reasonable agency rules unless Congress has directly spoken to the issue).  
96 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (identifying 
this threshold problem as “Chevron Step Zero”).  
97 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1884 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
accord id. at 1871 (Scalia, J., majority op.). But judicial deference is not stably allocated. 
See Jud Matthews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1352–53 (2013) (arguing 
that administrative agencies face a “‘deference lottery’ when they advance a statutory 
interpretation in a notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”).  
98 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). When an agency’s 
ideal point is closer to Congress’s than private litigants’, judicial deference does not 
undermine congressional control.  
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Article I rule-making authority, but also handicaps an important instrument 
of legislative control.99 
 
The demise of the nondelegation doctrine hence enabled an 
intragovernment market for law-making authority. Once, if Congress could 
not overcome its own veto-gates and attain policy outcomes by specifying 
those preferences in textual form first to be engrossed, then enrolled, it was 
out of luck. Now, Congress has another option: it can bargain with the 
executive over an open-ended delegation of rulemaking authority coupled to 
vague goals as a way to achieve policy change.100 Dollars may not be the 
coin of this marketplace, but it nonetheless has a transactional character. 
Congress is not merely waiving its Article I prerogatives. It is engaged in 
deliberate and reciprocal deals in which legislative authority is alienated in 
order to secure policy goods legislators could not otherwise obtain. 
Delegation is a negotiated deal, in short, in which power is traded for 
discretion.  
 
Alternatively, interbranch transfers of regulatory authority are 
achieved through customary interbranch accords. In military and foreign 
affairs matters, the Court permits unilateral executive action based not only 
on a present legislative delegation, but also on prior congressional action. 
The Court has held that a historical interbranch consensus can operate as a 
“gloss” on ambiguous Constitution text.101 In Dames & Moore v. Regan, for 
example, the Court endorsed executive power to create unilaterally a 
supranational claims tribunal through an agreement with Iran on the ground 
that previous “Congress[es] ha[d] implicitly approved the practice.”102 The 
holding rested on the principle that “a practice by one branch of government 
                                                 
99 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1749, 1769 (2007) (observing that “fire-alarm” oversight “is efficient because it 
shifts to third-parties the cost of gathering and processing information”).  
100 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST APPROACH TO POLICY-MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999) (arguing that 
as the complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specificity rise, legislators 
will tend more and more to delegate decisions rather than resolving hard questions 
themselves).  
101 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (relying on “historical 
glosses” on executive power); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (citing the 
absence of historical practice as one ground for denying congressional standing). 
102 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680, 686 (1981); accord Jefferson Powell, 
Essay, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 539 (1999) (“Agreement between the political branches on a 
course of conduct is important evidence that the conduct should be deemed 
constitutional.”). 
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that implicates the prerogatives of another branch gains constitutional 
legitimacy only if the other branch can be deemed to have ‘acquiesced’ in 
the practice over time.”103 More recently, the D.C. Circuit relied on “post-
ratification” practice to hold that Presidents have exclusive power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns.104 Like formal interbranch transfers of 
authority, the theory of historical gloss is a theory of interbranch 
agreements. It is not a constitutional analog to adverse possession. But the 
operative concept of agreement is ambiguous.105 As a result, the historical 
gloss doctrine diminishes Congress’s leverage. It creates the possibility that 
acquiesced-in delegations will not be accompanied by reciprocal gains for 
legislators.106  
 
A different regime, however, applies when an interbranch bargain 
slices up the law-making entitlement into something other than a cognizable 
delegation. In two notable cases, the Court has resisted new permutations of 
law-making authority by imposing inalienability rules. Its resistance echoes 
the private law numerus clausus principle, which directs that real property 
rights conform to certain standardized forms.107  
 
The legislative veto is an instructive example. The idea of reserving 
a veto to either one or both Houses did not germinate on Capitol Hill, but 
“originated because presidents wanted it…. Presidents asked Congress to 
delegate additional authority and were willing to accept the legislative veto 
                                                 
103 Curtis Bradley & Trevor Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411, 432 (2012). 
104 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, -- F.3d --, 2013 WL 3799663, at *12 (D.C. 
Cir. Jul. 23, 2013). 
105 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 103, at 433–38 (canvassing various possible 
meanings of “acquiescence”). 
106 By analogy with custom, it could be argued that the scope of federal court jurisdiction is 
“the subject of an ongoing dialogue between [Congress and the judiciary].” Barry 
Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990). Indeed, in the course of the serial opinions over 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation respecting the Guantánamo detentions, the Court referred 
to itself as embedded within an “ongoing dialogue between and among the branches of 
Government.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008). Whether the outcome of this 
“dialogue” reflects the preferences of all branches, however, is quite another question. Cf. 
Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMM. 385, 402–05 (2010) (presenting 
empirical evidence to the effect that Supreme Court intervention in military detentions at 
Guantánamo has failed to have any significant libertarian effect).  
107 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (2000) (noting that numerus clausus 
means“the number is closed”). 
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that controlled the delegation.”108 President Herbert Hoover, seeking broad 
authority from Congress to reorganize the federal executive, first proposed a 
legislative veto, and secured one in 1933 reorganization legislation.109 
Legislative vetoes were then incorporated into “hundreds” of statutes as the 
price of legislative delegations.110 So indispensable did it become that in the 
sixteen months after the device’s judicial repudiation, Congress still enacted 
fifty-three legislative vetoes.111  
 
INS v. Chadha was the occasion for the Court’s invalidation of the 
legislative veto.112 It arose out of deportation proceedings in which the 
House of Representatives had exercised a legislative veto to evacuate relief 
from deportation granted to six noncitizens.113 Chief Justice Burger 
reasoned that the House veto was “essentially legislative in purpose and 
effect” because it “had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, 
duties and relations of persons,” and hence could only be valid if passed 
through bicameralism and presentment.114 Scholars quickly condemned the 
decision’s formalist character115 and noted that it failed to recognize the 
realities of delegation in the post-New Deal regulatory state.116 
 
Like the legislative veto, the line-item veto also endeavored to 
rearrange lawmaking authority between the branches. Unlike the legislative 
veto, but like delegation, it moved a quantum of congressional authority to 
the President. The 1994 Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to cancel 
“(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of 
new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.”117 Like the legislative 
veto, the line-item veto was a voluntary deal. It was proposed by the branch 
that lost power (Congress) at a time the other branch was led by a political 
                                                 
108 Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., 273, 273–74 (1993). 
109 Id. at 278–79. 
110 William West & Joseph Cooper, The Congressional Veto and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 286 (1983). 
111 Louis Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative 
Veto Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 706 (1985). 
112 462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983). 
113 Id. at 926–27. 
114 Id. at 951–52 (op. of Burger, C.J.). 
115 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 250 
(2007). 
116 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 88, at 1252–53. 
117 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III). 
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foe.118 Legislators were under no illusions about what they had renounced. 
“Make no mistake about it,” prophesized Republican Sen. Jon Kyl (a 
supporter of the proposal), a line item veto “will shift a great deal of new 
power to … President [Clinton].” 119 The policy good that Sen. Kyl and 
others received in exchange for alienating some of their Article I authority 
was a potential solution to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ problems facing the 
federal fisc. In this dynamic, each legislator wishing to maintain federal 
budgetary integrity but also shirking their role in the hope that other 
legislators would take up the slack.120  
 
In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court invalidated the line-item 
veto on formalist grounds similar to Chadha’s.121 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Stevens reasoned from the Presentment Clause to conclude that 
“constitutional silence” about unilateral Presidential action repealing or 
amending parts of duly enacted statutes should be “construe[d] … as 
equivalent to an express prohibition.”122 Clinton installed a distinction 
between “cancellation and modification delegations on the one hand and the 
familiar lawmaking delegations.”123 That is, Congress can alienate 
regulatory authority but not fiscal authority. It is not clear the distinction is 
cogent. When Congress delegates regulatory discretion, it necessarily vests 
the executive with some discretion over the costs of administration and the 
enforcement of fines. Indeed, Justice Scalia in his Clinton v. City of New 
York dissent reasoned that Congress could achieve substantially the same 
effect as a line-item veto by alternative means; he thus condemned the 
Court for being “fak[ed] out” by the Act’s title.124  
                                                 
118 It was the newly elected Republican House majority in 1994 that proposed and pushed 
the line item veto, which most immediately empowered President Clinton. Elizabeth 
Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and The Line Item Veto 
Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 872 (1999) [hereinafter “Garrett, Accountability and 
Restraint”]. This was not the first time a line item veto had been proposed in Congress. See 
Alan Morrison, The Line Item Veto: Both Parties Want It, but Is It Constitutional? Yes: 
Unbundling Omnibus Bills Won't Work, 81 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1995). When Hoover first 
proposed the legislative veto, by contrast, his fellow Republicans controlled both houses. 
Id. 
119 142 Cong. Rec. S2978 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
120 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 892, 
892 (stating that the Act was intended to help reduce “run-away federal spending and a 
rising national debt”). 
121 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
122 Id. at 439. 
123 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1, 4–5 (1998). 
124 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 468-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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3. Bargaining over Fiscal Authority  
 
Congress and the President have agreed on a series of legislative 
enactments that move substantial fiscal authority between chambers and 
across the interbranch divide.125 Some of these deals have been durable, 
others evanescent. Each embodies a negotiated reallocation of the fiscal 
authorities initially assigned by Article I of the Constitution.  
 
Consider first shifting entitlements between legislative chambers. 
The Origination Clause allocates first-mover rights on fiscal matters to the 
House. But the Senate often “takes a revenue bill passed by the House … 
strikes the language of the bill entirely, and replaces it with its own revenue 
bill unrelated to the one that began in the House.”126 Further, the House 
lacks a constitutional role in drafting or enactment revenue-raising tax 
treaties, but these “have become an important and frequently used 
coordination device between countries, with the United States entering into 
nearly seventy such instruments.”127 Through inattention or acquiescence, 
the House’s role in fiscal agenda-setting has thus waned.  
 
Negotiated reworkings of constitutional authority over the federal 
fisc postdate World War I.128 In 1919, the House Appropriations Committee 
established a Select Committee on the Budget that drafted a new 
framework, one that “vested responsibility for the preparation of the budget 
solely in the President and provided for the establishment in his office of a 
Bureau of the Budget to give him technical assistance.”129 The ensuing 
1921 law reallocated Congress’s right to set the fiscal agenda to the 
President.130 The executive also gained authority to identify the baseline 
                                                 
125 See William G. Dauster, The Congressional Budget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH to Budget Policy 6–15 (E. Garrett et al. eds., 2008). 
126 Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause. 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2014) (draft at 3), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271261.  
127 Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2–
3 (2013); id. at 29–31 (arguing that the Origination Clause should be read as a constraint on 
the Treaty Power to preserve the House’s role in fiscal matters).  
128 For the pre-twentieth century history, see id. at 5–6; see also Kate Stith, Congress’ 
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343, 1364-77 (1988) (discussing the two major pieces 
of nineteenth century framework legislation to exercise control over budgeting). 
129 PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
323 (2d ed. 1963). 
130 See Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, tit. II, 42 Stat. 20, 20-23 
(granting greater budgetary powers to the President), amended by Reorganization Act of 
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against which proposed fiscal changes are measured.131 The executive’s 
agenda-setting authority is further amplified by an implicit delegation 
bundled into most appropriations measures. Congress no longer enacts line-
by-line appropriations targeting discrete offices, but parcels out funds in 
agency-specific lump-sums denominated in the millions to hundreds of 
millions of dollars.132 As a result, the President wields large influence on 
the intragovernmental and geographic distributions of federal dollars.133  
 
Executive dominance of budgeting is not immutable. Between 1990 
and 2002, for example, budgeting operated under the “PAYGO rules” 
negotiated between President George H.W. Bush and Congress, which 
required that a class of new tax cuts and spending programs be funded via 
revenue offsets.134 When Congress failed to offset new covered spending, 
the President was empowered to issue a mandatory sequestration order.135 
PAYGO, however, expired in 2002, and has not since been renewed, 
ratcheting back the scope of authority delegated to the executive.136 
 
                                                                                                                            
1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, §201, 53 Stat. 561, 565 (expanding the President's budgetary 
control to include “any regulatory commission or board”). The suasive effect of the 
President’s budget, nevertheless, is debated. See Dauster, supra note 125, at 17 (“Congress 
can and often does treat the president’s budget as just so many suggestions.”). 
131 For instance, after the enactment of temporary tax cuts, President George W. Bush 
proposed that those cuts be treated as permanent for subsequent budgeting purposes such 
that these extensions would be recorded as budget neutral. See Rebecca Kysar, Lasting 
Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1028 (2011).  
132 See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 611 (1988) (noting that “appropriations legislation 
has generally contained less line-item detail than it did in the preceding 150 years 
[and] appropriations acts fund each broadly defined federal program or activity in 
one lump sum, termed a budget ‘account’”). The use of lump-sum appropriations 
remains the norm in current and pending appropriations measures. See, e.g., An Act 
Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense and the Other Departments 
and Agencies of the Government for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2011, and 
for Other Purposes, H.R. 1, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1eh.pdf. 
133 See Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, The President and the 
Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783, 786 (2010). 
134 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the 
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 507–14 (1998) (describing PAYGO).  
135 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-580, tit. XIII, §13101, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-574 to 1388-583 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §900-903 (2000)).  
136 For an evaluation of PAYGO, see Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution With 
Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 471, 481 (1999). 
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The Court has been largely absent from these negotiations.137 Its 
only significant judicial intervention was Bowsher v. Synar, which 
invalidated elements of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985.138 This statute allocated sequestration authority to the 
Comptroller-General, who the Court found to be an agent of Congress.139 
Deploying a formalist logic parallel to Chadha’s, Chief Justice Burger 
explained that this allocation of sequestration authority “plac[ed] the 
responsibility for execution of the [law] in the hands of an officer who is 
subject to removal only by … Congress,” which “in effect … retained 
control over the execution of the Act and … intruded into the executive 
function.”140 Later cases gloss Bowsher in terms of a functionalist concern 
about congressional self-aggrandizement.141 Indeed, Congress reacted to 
Bowsher by delegating sequestration authority to the (executive-branch) 
Office of Management and Budget.142 But Bowsher, like Chadha and 
Clinton, can equally be understood in terms of a constitutional numerus 
clausus principle: Congress can delegate fiscal discretion wholesale, but it 
cannot unbundle that discretion to reserve a meaningful veto at the margin. 
 
B. Bargaining between the States and the Federal Government 
 
The Constitution bifurcates regulatory jurisdiction between the 
several states and the federal government. Efforts to police the ensuing line 
occupy an inordinate share of judicial bandwidth.143 Despite the vigor and 
persistence of judicial invigilation, however, the federal–state border is still 
characterized by vigorous trading. This section documents diverse forms of 
regulatory exchange between the federal government and the states to 
                                                 
137 In 1975, the Court declined to find implied presidential impoundment authority without 
statutory authorization. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44−46 (1975). This 
occurred at a time of great political controversy over President Nixon’s employment of 
impoundment, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENT 133−34 (4th ed. 1997), and so might be tallied in the ranks of judicial 
intrusions into fiscal institutional design. The Court has allowed private litigants to bring 
Origination Clause challenges, but adopted a narrow view of the Clause’s reach. United 
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1990). 
138 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922 (West Supp. 1986). 
139 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986). 
140 Id. at 734. 
141 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 684–85 (1988). 
142 Dauster, supra note 125, at 11. 
143 For a survey of relevant doctrine, see Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated 
Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 586–611 (2013). 
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suggest that the common image of a static “federal balance”144 elides 
operational realities.  
 
1. The Constitution’s Distribution of Regulatory Powers  
 
The Constitution’s central strategy for dividing federal and state 
domains hinges on the textual enumeration of national governmental 
authorities.145 This strategy is less successful than the Constitution’s 
interbranch allocation of responsibilities over law-making. Due to the 
constitutional text’s underspecification and ambiguity, judicial 
responsibility for drawing the margins of national authority has taken on 
large significance.146 With great responsibility, however, comes great 
divisiveness. The Justices not only differ on how to construe the 
Constitution’s grants of national power, but also on how to read its general 
rule of construction, which is contained in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.147 Divisive public and judicial disagreement about federalism may 
be so pervasive that it might fairly be ranked as a distinctive, identifying 
trait of American constitutionalism.  
 
Federal regulatory power rests centrally on the Commerce Clause, 
which licenses broad superintendence over the national economy and its 
                                                 
144 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
145 See, e.g.,National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2576 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,) (“[R]ather than granting general authority to perform all 
the conceivable functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal 
Government's powers…. The Constitution's express conferral of some powers makes clear 
that it does not grant others.”). 
146 Cf. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, 
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM & MARY L REV. 1733, 1748–49 (2005) (“The 
open-textured nature of the Constitution’s structural commitments calls for judicial 
implementation through doctrine: There is simply no way to administer our federal system 
without developing rules to flesh out the allocation and balance of authority.”). The era in 
which it was plausible to imagine dual, mutually exclusive sovereignties is long passed. 
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
147 For example, in United States v. Kebodeaux, seven Justices voted to uphold a civil 
registration requirement for those who had been subject to conviction in a military court 
martial before the enactment of the relevant registration statute, with four Justices 
characterizing the case as straightforward. 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502–05 (2013). Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito both concurred, registering disapproval of the majority’s method 
for resolving the scope of Necessary and Proper-related powers. Id. at 2505–08 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring); id. at 2508–09 (Alito, J., concurring). Given that dissenting Justices 
Scalia and Thomas offered slightly different accounts of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
it would seem that there are (at least) four different doctrinal accounts of that central 
constitutional provision on the Court. 
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constituent parts.148 Proper invocation of the Commerce Clause permits 
Congress to preempt contrary state laws or regulations.149 This regulatory 
jurisdiction is plenary if licitly exercised.150 When a federal law is presented 
in state court, state judicial officials have no option but to respect the 
federal preferences embodied therein.151 In addition to its enumerated 
regulatory authorities, the national government also can draw on its power 
to collect taxes and expend funds for “the common Defense and the general 
Welfare,”152 a power unbounded by other restraints on national regulatory 
authority.153 Congress can accordingly offer subsidies to subnational 
governments upon the condition that they undertake other policies. 
 
The Court has also imposed two significant constraints on the 
deployment of most (but not all) enumerated powers that have the effect of 
creating intergovernmental markets over regulation. First, when a federal 
law singles out state legislative or executive officials with a legal obligation 
that does not fall on private actors, it violates an “anti-commandeering” 
principle.154 Because “[s]tate sovereignty is not just an end in itself,” but a 
means to promoting individual liberty, the Court held that “departure[s] 
from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state 
officials.”155 Nevertheless, the federal government can “purchase the 
                                                 
148 U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States”). 
149 For an introduction to the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, see Ernest A. Young, “The 
Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253. 
150 One example is a state law that is preempted is “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). 
151 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a Rhode Island state court must 
entertain a federal claim arising under the Emergency Price Control Act); see also Evan H. 
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers 
to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1995) (exploring the scope of 
this obligation). 
152 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.1. 
153 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 718 n.1 
(5th ed. 1891) (opining that Congress’s taxation and spending powers are“not limited … to 
cases falling within specific powers enumerated in the Constitution”). 
154 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-25 & n.13 (1997) (holding that “[o]ur 
system of dual sovereignty” is incompatible with the commandeering of state executive 
officials to implement the gun control and registration provisions of the Brady Bill); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (explaining that “the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern 
[i.e., legislate] according to Congress' instructions”). 
155 New York, 505 U.S. at 121–82. 
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services of state and local government” in the same way it purchases private 
services.156 Accordingly, state administrative capacities are subject to a 
“modified property rule” under which the right may be sold, but not given 
away.157  
 
Second, glossing the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has directed 
that the federal government cannot use any of its 1787 powers to oust 
directly the states’ sovereign immunity from individual litigants’ damages 
actions in state or federal court.158 Such ouster, however, is permitted under 
the Reconstruction Amendments.159 Moreover, the federal government can 
purchase compliance through a conditional grant to the states, provided that 
the legislation in question articulates with heightened precision the scope of 
the immunity waiver.160  
 
Although explained as vindications of states’ rights, the anti-
commandeering and sovereign immunity doctrines both create property 
rules rather than inalienability rules. That is, they do not immunize state 
regulatory jurisdiction, but instead facilitate its trade. This contrasts sharply 
with the Court’s approach in separation of powers jurisprudence, where 
inalienability rules dominate. In the balance of this section, I accordingly 
show how this basic framework is employed in intergovernmental 
bargaining. First, I show that preemptive national laws can be sites for 
bargaining both pre- and post-enactment. I then consider two special 
cases—when a federal law is the result of interstate bargaining outside 
Congress and cooperative federalism programs. Finally, I examine 
conditional federal spending as a bargain.  
 
                                                 
156 Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 38, at 819.  
157 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 947. 
158 See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not abrogate 
the States’ immunity for suits in state court); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 54 (1996) (not allowing ouster of state sovereign immunity under Article I powers). 
Oddly, bankruptcy is another exception. Central Va. Community Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 
356 (2006).  
159 See, e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) 
(permitting money damages action under the family-care provision of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532–33 (2004) (upholding 
applications of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act that implicated fundamental 
rights, such as the right of access to courts).  
160 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  
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2. Federal Law as Intergovernmental Bargain: Pre-enactment 
and Post-Enactment Bargaining  
 
 Even though states have no formal voice in national lawmaking,161 
federal laws still reflect the interests of both the federal government and the 
several states. Rather than preemptively repudiating states’ sovereign 
interests, in consequence, it is possible to rank some federal laws are the 
outcomes of intergovernmental negotiation within Congress.  
 
 Even in the absence of any constitutional entitlement, states have 
both a stake in and an influence on legislated bargains. States have an 
incentive to participate in the federal legislative process because they stand 
to gain when national public goods are realized. Alternatively, they might 
seek federal legislation to muffle interstate competition and protect their 
own inefficient rules.162 States’ voice in Congress is credible for four 
reasons. First, state officials control access to electioneering and get-out-
the-vote resources that are vital to federal politicians.163 Second, vocal 
public opposition of state officials may be politically costly for federal 
officials, making negotiation more desirable than confrontation. Third, 
states’ governance infrastructure—while immune from direct federal 
takeover as a consequence of the anti-commandeering rule164—may be 
needed for operationalizing a law.165 There are also limits to what the 
federal government can practically compel even when it does have legal 
authority to dictate state action. For example, the 2005 REAL ID’s 
mandatory federal standards for state-issued identification sparked protests 
and ultimately noncompliance by states, ultimately forcing the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to defer that final implementation.166 Finally, states can 
force federal legislative action by forging ahead in a new policy domain 
                                                 
161 The Seventeenth Amendment eliminated the possibility of direct transmissions of 
preferences between state and federal legislatures. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 17. 
162 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 110 (2001) (defining horizontal aggrandizement). 
163 Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 279–84 (2000) (emphasizing the role that local and state parties 
have in national elections). 
164 See cases cited supra in note 154. 
165 Cf. Heather Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L. J. 2633, 2635 (2006) 
(“The power of the servant thus stems mainly from dependence: The fact that the higher 
authority needs the servant to perform a task creates space not just for discretionary 
decision-making, but also for bureaucratic pushback.”). 
166 See National Conference of State Legislators, The History of Federal Requirements for 
State-Issued Drivers Licenses and ID Cards, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=13581. 
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before the national government can act.167 In these ways, states set the 
agenda and influence the contents of national law. 
 
States further have institutional means to achieve such influence. An 
important channel for such bargaining is states’ lobbying organizations.168 
Since the turn of the twentieth century, states have cultivated a powerful 
“intergovernmental lobby” of organizations such as the Council of State 
Legislators and the National Governors’ Association to represent their 
interests in Congress.169 This lobby ensures that states’ interests are at least 
raised prior to a law’s enactment.170 The states’ lobby’s many successes171 
include aspects of the Affordable Care Act that were modified to account 
for states’ concerns.172 
 
Nor need bargaining cease once federal law is enacted. Federal laws, 
even when preemptive in general effect, sometimes assign property interests 
to states allowing vetoes of federal regulatory efforts. For instance, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act imposes a prerequisite of state certification 
prior to any federally funded activity.173 The Federal Clean Water Act also 
allows states to condition their certification of covered projects upon any 
limitations deemed necessary by the state to ensure compliance with state 
water quality standards.174  
 
Such entitlements may be prophylaxis against anticipated 
constitutional challenges. In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, for 
example, the Court held that a provision of the National Voter Registration 
                                                 
167 See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON & ORG. 313, 
327, 330 (1985) (developing example of the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act of 1965).  
168 JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR 
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 70–74 (2009) (documenting “several ways” in 
which state officials participate in congressional lawmaking); Jane G. Gravelle & Jennifer 
Gravelle, How Federal Policymakers Account for the Concerns of State and Local 
Governments in the Formulation of Federal Tax Policy, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 631, 631 (2007).  
169 See Samuel Beer, Political Overload and Federalism, 10 POLITY 5, 11 (1977) 
(describing diverse forms of state pre-enactment lobbying). 
170 John P. Pelissero & Robert E. England, State and Local Governments’ Washington 
“Reps”—Lobbying Strategies and President Reagan’s New Federalism, 19 STATE & 
LOCAL GOV’T REV. 68, 68 (1987).  
171 See NUGENT, supra note 168, at 146–67 (cataloging successes). 
172 John Dinan, Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 41 PUBLIUS 1, 13 (2011). 
173 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A).  
174 See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711–12 (1994). 
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Act (NVRA)175 requiring states to “accept and use” a federally produced 
voter registration form preempted an Arizona statutory provision that 
required proof of citizenship to register to vote by mail.176 The Court 
responded to Arizona’s argument that such preemption impinged upon its 
sovereign authority to establish voting qualification by explaining that “no 
constitutional doubt is raised” when an “alternative means of enforcing [the 
state’s] constitutional power to determine voting qualifications remains 
open to Arizona.”177 The Court noted that the NVRA allowed states to 
petition the federal Election Assistance Commission to change the 
mandated registration template.178 Post-enactment exercise of a statutory 
veto, that is, mitigated federalism concerns. But a future federal failure to 
respond to such a request, cautioned Justice Scalia pointedly, might lead to 
a constitutional order.179 Hence, the state’s statutory entitlement under the 
NVRA is rendered more credible, even necessary, by the shadow of 
constitutional law. 
 
3. Federal Law as Intergovernmental Bargain: The Case of 
Bargaining Outside The National Legislative Process 
 
Intergovernmental negotiation need not occur within the precincts of 
the national legislative process. Examination of the seminal anti-
commandeering case, New York v. United States,180 reveals that federal law 
can emerge out of bargaining between states outside the Beltway. The 
federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA)181 imposed a 
federal regime respecting the production and disposal of radioactive waste. 
It sought to mitigate a status quo ante in which disposal sites were 
concentrated in a handful of states, which threatened to close their facilities 
                                                 
175 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq. 
176 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2251 (2013). 
177 Id. at 2260. 
178 Id. at 2259 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–7(a)(2)). 
179 Id. at 2260 n.10. A further wrinkle in the Inter Tribal case is that the Election Assistance 
Commission lacked a quorum to function, and a concurrent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruling precluded the White House from using recess appointments to fill the post. See 
Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 499–512 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted 2013 WL 
1774240 (Jun 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281) (identifying U.S. Const. Art II, §2, cl. 3 as basis of 
challenge). Hence, a seizure in interbranch bargaining may well lead to a breakdown in 
intergovernmental bargaining—an example of entanglement between the two species of 
negotiation discussed in this Part. 
180 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
181 Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980), amended by Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (current version 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (2006)). 
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entirely.182 Its mandate “resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve 
a state-based set of remedies to the waste problem.”183 The LLRWPA thus 
was an intermural bargain between states to alienate a portion of their 
regulatory suzerainty so as to solve a collective action problem. Application 
of the anti-commandeering rule to negate this bargain did not serve the 
interests of the states as against federal overreaching. Instead, it enabled one 
state (New York) to continue imposing costs without internalizing a share 
of the collective burden. New York, that is, could continue imposing costs 
on others that were generally perceived as disproportionate or unfair.184 
From this perspective, the Court’s choice to frame its analysis about the 
question whether New York was “estop[ped]” from challenging its earlier 
agreement as a violation of state sovereignty is question begging.185  
 
This analysis suggests that a federal statute that ‘commandeers’ a 
state’s executive or legislative process can have diverse explanations. On 
the one hand, a federal law that engages in commandeering may be a 
malignant effort by Congress to impose unfunded mandates on the states 
while taking credit for downstream policy achievements.186 On the other 
hand, commandeering may also be a signal that the states and the federal 
government have reached a welfare-enhancing deal that solves collective 
action problems among the several states.187 Such deals might build on what 
the long history of federal legislative ratification of interstate deals in 
territorial disputes.188 Hence, the anti-commandeering rule installed in New 
York and Printz v. United States may have democratic and fiscal 
                                                 
182 Ryan, ‘Cathedral’, supra note 12, at 42. 
183 New York, 505 U.S. at 189–90 (White, J., dissenting). 
184 The LLRWPA, however, contained other punitive mechanisms that waste importing 
states might have employed.  
185 New York, 505 U.S. at 183 (“That a party collaborated with others in seeking legislation 
has never been understood to estop the party from challenging that legislation in 
subsequent litigation.”). 
186 In Printz v. United States, however, the Court suggests in passing that the 
anticommandeering rule would also apply to mandatory commandeering with offsetting 
federal subsidies. 521 U.S. 898, 914 n.7, 930 (1997).  
187 See Neil Siegel, Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1660-64 (2006) (arguing that in thwarting the state-based solution, 
the Court's decision in New York was ultimately more destructive to state sovereignty 
interests than would have been a decision to uphold the take-title provision). In addition, 
commandeering may be preferable to a voluntary program with cash transfers because the 
latter would be vulnerable to moral hazard problems. See Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing 
Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (1999). 
188 Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. -- (forthcoming 2014) (draft 
at 6, 31–39). 
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justifications (albeit only if the federal government cannot secure unfunded 
mandates by other means189), but it also stifles a potent source of future 
deal-makings among states and the national government.190  
 
4. Cooperative Federalism as Bargaining  
 
Congress can employ its Article I, section 8 enumerated powers to 
establish a “cooperative federalism” program. Narrowly defined, 
cooperative federalism encompasses “programs in which the federal 
government establishes minimum standards that states may opt to 
implement through programs that are no less stringent.”191 In such 
programs, “nonfederal governments help implement federal policy in a 
variety of ways: by submitting implementation plans to federal agencies, by 
promulgating regulations, and by bringing administrative actions to enforce 
federal statutes.”192 Cooperative federalism programs “see[k] to exploit 
economies of scale by establishing national … standards while leaving their 
attainment to state authorities subject to federal oversight.”193 These efforts 
are typically created through conditionally preempting legislation.194 State 
agencies are invited, but not required, to participate.195 In effect, these deals 
reflect the exercise of a modified liability rule vested in the federal 
government: The latter can regulate directly if it pays the costs of 
administration, or it can allow the state to maintain administrative primacy, 
albeit in pursuit of federal aims. 
                                                 
189 See Siegel, supra note 187, at 1646–60 (exploring the existence of alternatives to 
commandeering).  
190 Interstate compacts may provide an incomplete substitute because of constraints on their 
enforceability. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2305–13 (2010) 
(declining to penalize state that opted out of an interstate compact respecting radioactive 
waste). 
191 Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 179, 188-204 (2005) (also providing examples from the environmental 
domain); accord Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism, Federal Common Law, and 
The Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1696 (2001). 
192 Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 38, at 815. 
193 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1148-78 (1995). 
194 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288–89 
(1980) (“If a state does not want to submit a … program that complies … the full 
regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government.”); see generally DAVID B. 
WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON (2d ed. 
2000). 
195 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications 
Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19 (1999) (describing operation of cooperative federalism 
under the 1996 Telecommunications Act). 
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 Studies of cooperative federalism schemes suggest that despite its 
preemptive authority, the national government does not hold all the cards. 
Instead, “states can continue to exert influence through enforcement of 
federal law.”196 The practical effect of the constitutional structure is to 
assign to states a set of regulatory resources that can be leveraged to secure 
shifts to federal policies. Most importantly, state governments tend to have 
“local expertise [and] … boots on the ground [and] perceived legitimacy” 
necessary for programs’ implementation that the federal government 
lacks.197 Indeed, the federal government may be unable to achieve national 
public goods without state officials’ voluntary cooperation.198 States also 
use their monopoly on implementation resources to negotiate alternatives to 
policy calibrations initially specified by the federal government. On one 
view, “local tailoring” of this kind is a central benefit of cooperative 
federalism.199 Some federal programs even formalize this possibility by 
including explicit waiver provisions that allow state opt-outs from certain 
conditions.200 For example, as of April 2013, thirty-three states had secured 
waivers from 2002 No Child Left Behind mandates.201  
 
Alternatively, states might deploy their discretionary authority under 
cooperative federalism programs to adopt policies at odds with federal 
goals.202 In one striking example from the early 1980s, Congress amended 
the Social Security Act in June 1980 to compel increased scrutiny of 
beneficiaries’ disability status—a priority of the Reagan Administration—
                                                 
196 Margaret Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 
703 (2011); see also Weiser, supra note 195, at 1732 (“[C]ooperative federalism statutes 
give state agencies considerable discretion to address interstitial matters left open by 
federal agencies.”). 
197 Ryan, Negotiated Federalism, supra note 12, at 90. 
198 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2139 
(2002) (noting federal need for state and local police). 
199 Weiser, supra note 195, at 1699. 
200 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
265, 275–85 (2013) (providing examples of waiver provisions in cooperative federalism 
programs concerning education and social welfare). 
201 Id. at 280–81. 
202 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. 
J. 1258, 1281–82 (2009) (supplying examples); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in 
Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 187–88 (1998) (narrating how 
states obtained changes to federal welfare policy in the 1960s through resistance to 
executive positions in Congress). 
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but state resistance brought the initiative to a halt.203 In this way, the 
exercise of enforcement-related discretion can operate as a chip with which 
states can bargain to influence and alter the direction of putatively 
nationalized policies. Cooperative federalism is therefore properly viewed 
as an invitation to, not an absolute ousting of, intergovernmental bargaining. 
 
5. Conditional Spending as Bargaining 
 
Congress’s conditional spending power not only allows it to 
purchase anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity entitlements, but 
also to buy state legislation that cannot be preempted.204 Congress 
commonly uses its spending power to offer states “bargains … in which the 
federal government negotiates to extend its regulatory reach into zones 
otherwise constitutionally reserved to the states.”205 To the extent the Court 
recognizes policy “areas such as criminal law enforcement or education 
where States historically have been sovereign,”206 such recognition marks 
the beginning of intergovernmental negotiation, not its terminus.  
 
Conditional spending legislation is “in the nature of a contract: in 
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed 
conditions.”207 The 2002 No Child Left Behind, or NCLB, exemplifies such 
an intervention into a domain of traditional state control.208 Notwithstanding 
the take-it-or-leave-it character of spending power deals, states still possess 
“unappreciated power” to resist the federal government.209 To begin with, 
                                                 
203 MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 36–39 (1990). 
204 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (holding that 
Congress could condition an offer of federal funds to the states on the latters’ curtailing of 
certain officials’ partisan political activities even though “the United States … has no 
power to … regulate local political activity as such of state officials”). 
205 Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37 (2011) [hereinafter Ryan, 
Negotiating Federalism]. 
206 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(expressing concern at federal takeover of “entire areas of traditional state concern”); 
accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000). 
207 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“Congress may fix 
the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States.”). 
208 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006)); see 
James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 932, 939–44 (2004) (summarizing key provisions). The other important federal 
intervention on education, Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006)), is also 
conditional spending legislation. 
209 Ryan, Negotiated Federalism, supra note 205, at 89–90. 
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states’ lobbies are actively involved in lobbying over the content of 
conditional spending enactments, “asking for either … unconditional 
grants… or grants with conditions that, as a practical matter, are already 
consistent with the states' own spending priorities.”210 States can also 
decline federal funding, holding out for a better deal. Since the Supreme 
Court limited the Medicaid expansion in the 2010 healthcare law, for 
example, fourteen states have rejected health funding totaling about $8.4 
billion covering roughly 3.6 million of their citizens.211 Once grants are 
made, states draw on political resources in Congress to “bargain with the 
national government over how stringently the national government will 
enforce the conditions ostensibly attached to the national funds.”212 
Outcomes achieved through conditional spending, in short, are bargained 
for all the way down.  
 
Judicial doctrine nevertheless imposes two constraints on 
intergovernmental bargaining over conditional spending. First, the Court 
requires that conditions be unambiguous and “[r]elated” to the federal 
interest in particular national projects or programs.213 This ensures that “the 
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”214 
Second, notice and nexus requirements have recently been supplemented by 
an inchoate anti-coercion rule. The Court thus partially invalidated the 
Medicaid expansion contained in the 2010 healthcare legislation on 
coercion grounds.215 Unlike earlier Spending Clause enactments considered 
by the Court, the 2010 Affordable Care Act tied new funding to an ongoing 
funding stream in a way that attached “significant … new conditions … to 
continued participation in an entrenched and lucrative cooperative program” 
in a way that the Court deemed objectionable.216 The Court’s opaque 
formulation of its anti-coercion rule renders its precedential force 
                                                 
210 Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 38, at 859. 
211 Carter Price & Christine Eibner, For States that Opt out of Medicaid Expansion: 3.6 
Million Fewer Insured and $8.6 Billion Less in Federal Payments, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1030, 
1030 (2013).  
212 Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 38, at 861; see also MARTHA DERTHICK, THE 
INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS 196 (1970) (noting variance in enforcement strength); 
John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 994, 1008-11 
(1985) (describing influence of congressional delegations). 
213 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). The Dole Court also required that 
conditions be in furtherance of the general welfare and not independently barred by another 
constitutional provision. Id. But these conditions do no meaningful work and can safely be 
ignored here. 
214 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
215 NFIB v. Selebius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–09 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.). 
216 Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 870–71. 
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uncertain.217 But the new rule does not foreclose bargaining, but rather 
raises its cost by introducing a new form of uncertainty.  
 
C. The Pervasiveness of Intermural Bargaining 
 
In her majority opinion in New York v. United States, Justice 
O’Connor ventured that “[t]he Constitution's division of power among the 
three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, 
whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.”218 
Whatever its merit as judicial aspiration, her observation falls short as an 
account of current constitutional practice. Intermural bargaining to 
reallocate institutional entitlements created by the Constitution is the norm, 
not the exception. On the separation of powers side, Congress is allowed to 
alienate lawmaking power. It cannot, however, reserve a quantum of such 
authority to itself. The elected branches are also free to rearrange fiscal 
decision-making provided the resulting arrangements do not reserve to the 
president any line-item authority. Yet if the executive employs its large 
delegated powers to achieve fiscal effects (either by, say, spending less or 
by more aggressively enforcing federal tax laws), no constitutional concern 
is raised. Adding additional suppleness to fiscal arrangements, the House 
can relinquish its right to originate revenue bills through shell legislation or 
tax treaties, apparently with impunity.  
 
On the federalism side, the Court has favored bargaining, albeit 
within constraints. It has thus created entitlements in the form of the anti-
commandeering rule, state sovereign immunity, and exclusive domains of 
state regulation. Given Congress’s conditional spending authority, states 
can bargain away these entitlements in exchange for federal funds. More 
mundanely, the passage and implementation of federal laws supply ample 
opportunities for intergovernmental bargaining.  
 
However pervasive intermural bargaining is in contemporary 
constitutional law, it is not well theorized. Both the Court and 
commentators tend to view intermural bargaining in piecemeal fashion, not 
as a coherent singular phenomenon. Accordingly, it is simply unclear 
whether the Court has permitted the optimal amount or distribution of 
                                                 
217 See id. at 864–65 (offering a relatively restrained reading); Eloise Pasachoff, 
Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 577, 582 (2013) (analyzing Sebelius’s application to education statutes and 
predicting that the latter would survive judicial review).  
218 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). 
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structural constitutional bargaining. The Court may have erred in either 
direction by allowing too much or too little bargaining. Ascertaining 
whether there is sufficient or excessive bargaining requires a framework for 
evaluating its downsides and rewards. The next two Parts take up that task. 
III. The Default Rule for Intermural Bargaining 
 
 When representatives of institutions negotiate mutually beneficial 
deals to reallocate roles in the lawmaking process, elements of regulatory 
authority, or enforcement and administrative capacity, should federal 
judges, office holders in other branches, and the public accede to the 
ensuing deals? That is, should the approbatory presumption employed in the 
private law context apply here too? In this Part, I argue for a presumption in 
favor of intermural bargaining. The presumption, along with the exceptions 
developed in Part IV, should primarily guide officials and their constituents, 
and secondarily should provide a basis for judicial deference to intermural 
deals.  
 
I develop this claim in two steps. First, I examine and find wanting 
three potential grounds for taking Justice O’Connor at her word and flatly 
prohibiting all intermural bargaining.219 Accounting for textual, historical 
and consequential concerns, I conclude that a generalized suspicion of all 
interbranch and intergovernmental deals is unwarranted. Second, I identify 
positive consequences flowing from institutional deal-making, amplifying 
further the case for an affirmative default. The Court, I conclude, has 
correctly declined in practice to view intermural bargains with suspicion 
pace Justice O’Connor’s dictum.  
 
A. The Weak Case for a Categorical Rule against Intermural 
Bargaining  
 
 I first develop and evaluate two arguments to the effect that 
intermural bargaining should never be permitted. These rest on the 
definition of a constitution, and the core functions of a constitution. Neither 
argument, in my view, yields a reason to adopt a presumption against 
institutional bargaining.  
 
1. Entrenchment as a Defining Feature of the Constitution  
 
                                                 
219 Id.  
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 A common feature of constitutions, including the U.S. Constitution, 
is entrenchment beyond change via the ordinary procedures of quotidian 
democracy.220 Entrenchment so defined is more than mere endurance.221 It 
also requires procedural rules that make constitutional change more onerous 
than the mine run of lawmaking action. Article V of the Constitution does 
so by setting forth a two-stage procedure of proposal and ratification that 
makes textual amendment to the Constitution inordinately hard.222 If 
entrenchment beyond ordinary politics is a necessary aspect of 
constitutionalism, as Article V might suggest, then the prospect of 
intermural bargaining should seem deeply troubling: How can foundational 
entitlements—the basic building blocks of our nation’s democracy—be 
lightly frittered away by transient office holders in exchange for mere 
policy advantages? Perhaps a “working [c]onstitution” is one that political 
actors treat as “not subject to abrogation or material alteration.”223 On this 
view, a strong presumption against bargaining is implied in the definition of 
a constitution. A reading of the Constitution that permitted such bargaining 
would defeat the purpose of adopting a constitution. This argument might 
be framed not only in definitional terms, but also developed as a claim 
about the original public meaning of a constitution as a legal norm meant to 
stand beyond ordinary politics. 
 
This argument from entrenchment, whether pitched in definitional or 
originalist terms, is less persuasive than it first appears for three reasons. 
First, not all nations’ constitutions are entrenched beyond ordinary politics; 
accordingly, there is no definitional link between constitutionalism and 
entrenchment. Many other nations’ constitutions, in contrast to the United 
States’, invite constitutional amendment through procedures that resemble 
those of ordinary politics. Israel, for example, employs ordinary Knesset 
                                                 
220 Cf. David Fontana, Comment, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional 
Canon: Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 44 (2002) (“To believe in the 
Constitution means believing in … fundamental principles, and to believe in the 
Constitution means that you cannot believe in changing these principles.”); see also 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111–14 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing 
entrenchment). 
221 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 702–03 (2011) (criticizing definitions of 
constitutional entrenchment than rely solely on endurance). 
222 See U.S. CONST., art. V; see also Huq, Function of Article V, supra note 19, at – 
(discussing amendment procedures and documenting consensus view that Article V is very 
resilient to change). 
223 K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1934); 
accord Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J. 408, 
426 (2007).  
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procedures and voting rules for adopting new Basic Laws.224 The 
Columbian constitution of 1886 allows the legislature to amend it after three 
readings and a supermajority vote in a subsequent legislative session.225 
Closer to home, “some fourteen American states to this day require the 
people to be consulted on a regular basis by the legislature as to whether to 
call a constitutional convention.”226 In effect, these state constitutions invite 
the electorate, as a matter of routine politics, to renegotiate questions of 
perceived constitutional magnitude. If entrenchment is not a necessary 
feature of constitutions as a whole, it is hard to see why it should be 
required in respect to discrete elements of a constitution, such as the 
location of lawmaking or regulatory entitlements.  
 
Second, it is not clear that the Constitution’s text mandates a 
prohibition, or even a presumption, against institutional bargaining. It may 
be tempting to assume that the textual vesting of entitlements should be 
glossed as inviolate, so that Congress could never bargain away a sliver of 
legislative power, the executive could not trade on its veto, and the states 
could not negotiate away fragments of their sovereignty. But the text of the 
Constitution contains no plainly stated rule barring any and all bargaining 
over institutional powers. Nothing in the text, that is, directs that 
institutional entitlements should be read as inalienable as opposed to default 
assignments.227 To the contrary, Madison’s proposal to the first Congress 
that the Constitution’s distribution of power among the branches be read as 
exclusive, precluding any innovations by later generations, was never 
adopted.228 That Madison saw a need for such a proposal, and that the first 
Congress rejected the idea powerfully suggests that the Constitution’s 
textual distribution of institutional authorities should be read as a set of 
default entitlements subject to alteration by later political branch 
negotiation.  
                                                 
224 Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the 
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 457, 468 (2012). Amendments to existing Basic Laws, however, are subject to 
a more onerous supermajority procedure. Id.  
225 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 101 (2009).  
226 Id. at 13.  
227 See McGinnis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 295 (suggesting that “the 
initial distribution of [branches’] rights” may be “merely a baseline”).  
228 See 1Annals of Cong. 435–36 (June 1789). The amendment would have provided that 
the “Legislative Department shall never exercise the powers vested in the Executive or 
Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the 
Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Executive Departments.” Id. .  
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The Framers were familiar with default rules. They employed a 
default rule in respect to the size of Article III. The Constitution’s text 
requires only the creation of one Supreme Court staffed with solely one 
Justice.229 In what came to be known as the Madisonian compromise, the 
decision whether to depart from this default state was assigned to 
Congress.230 It left a central element of interbranch design and 
intergovernmental relations to postratification legislators’ discretion. 
Federal jurisdiction, in consequence, became a “battlefield” on which “the 
sometimes-ill-defined scheme of federal government” was fought out 
between the national government and the states.231 Once created, moreover, 
Article III tribunals complement, and also compete with, state tribunals. 
Congress can award federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain 
subject matters.232 Or it might allow removal as a tool for disciplining state 
tribunals.233 The scope of jurisdictional optionality, moreover, may be even 
greater than the Madisonian compromise if Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 
is read to enable Congress to move grants of jurisdiction freely between the 
Supreme Court’s original and appellate wings. Of course, the Supreme 
Court famously held otherwise in 1803.234 Marbury v. Madison’s 
conclusion that Congress could not add to the Court’s enumerated original 
jurisdiction, though, has been powerfully challenged.235 There is no reason, 
moreover, to think the Constitution’s use of default rules is limited to 
Article III. Article I, for example, uses defeasible defaults in respect to the 
                                                 
229 U.S. CONST. art. III, §1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”). 
230 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 
1569 (1990) (describing the Madisonian compromise). 
231 ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 177 
(2010). 
232 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases 
“arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”). 
233 See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (framing the removal question 
as follows: “Does the ‘state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually 
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities’?”) (quoting 
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 
(2005)).  
234 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803); see also James E. Pfander, 
Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1484–87 (2000) (exploring Marbury’s distinction).  
235 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L. J. 
1, 9–33. It may that Marbury’s grip on the American legal imagination causes us to see 
mandates too often where the Framers installed defaults. 
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first congressional apportionment and the timing of Congress’s first 
meeting.236  
 
Finally, original public meaning does not furnish any basis for a per 
se bar on institutional deals. Conventional originalist analysis instead 
incorporates the outcomes of interbranch negotiation into its hermeneutical 
matrix. As one leading advocate of originalism has explained, political 
actors fashion “constitutional constructions … in the context of political 
debate, but to the degree that they are successful [such constructions] 
constraint future political debate.”237 For example, one much-analyzed 
question concerns the President’s authority to remove certain executive 
branch officials as pursuant to Article II.238 Such power arguably lies at the 
cusp of the President’s power to “take Care” that the laws are enforced,239 
and Congress’s horizontal “Necessary and Proper” power240 to structure 
other branches of the federal government.241 To resolve this dispute, leading 
originalists focus not just on the constitutional text (which at best is 
indeterminate), but instead find definitive resolution in the post-ratification 
bargain reached by the First Congress and President Washington over the 
first cabinet departments of War, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury.242 If it is 
feasible to use post-ratification intermural settlements as a source of 
constitutional meaning, it follows that there is no necessary incongruity 
under originalist accounts of Constitution and intermural bargaining.  
 
To be sure, the application of originalist tools to specific 
institutional entitlements might generate the conclusion that specific 
bargains lie out of constitutional bounds. For example, there is a vigorous 
debate on whether delegations of Article I rulemaking authority to 
                                                 
236 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. 
237 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 6 (1999). 
238 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, 
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 
(1992). 
239 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
240 U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3 & § 8, cl. 18. 
241 Cf. Patricia Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1371, 1382–88 (2012) (analyzing the removal power question by taking these two 
provisions as defining landmarks).  
242 See Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 
1029–34 (2006). 
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administrative agencies are consistent with the original understanding.243 
Without seeking to settle that intractable debate, it suffices here to say that 
no version of originalism in circulation today rejects all interbranch 
bargains. Indeed, one of the leading originalist accounts of Article I allows 
for intermural bargaining over legislative power. Developed by Professor 
Thomas Merrill, this account suggests that “Congress has the power to vest 
executive and judicial officers with authority to act with the force of law, 
including the authority to promulgate legislative regulations functionally 
indistinguishable from statutes” but “executive and judicial officers have no 
inherent authority to act with the force of law, but must trace any such 
authority to some provision of enacted law.”244 Hence, even in respect to 
core Article I entitlements, there is a plausible originalist reading of the 
Constitution consistent with a broad scope for interbranch deal-making.  
 
In sum, the entrenchment-based argument against intermural 
bargaining fails whether framed as a matter of definitional logic or 
historical meaning. The Constitution contains a mix of default and 
mandatory rules. The text contains no simple instruction about how to gloss 
each entitlement. Rather than categorically resisting intermural bargaining, 
it accordingly makes more sense to analyze specific institutional 
entitlements on a retail basis.  
 
2. Entrenchment and the Functions of Constitutionalism  
 
 A second argument against intermural bargaining under any 
circumstances might rest on functional grounds. A categorical bar might be 
justified, that is, if the deals that result undermine core, irreducible 
functions of a constitution. Jon Elster has posited that “[t]he purpose of 
entrenched clauses [in a constitution] … is to ensure a reasonable degree of 
stability in the political system and to protect minority rights.”245 If stability 
is a central good produced by constitutions, the Constitution’s initial 
distribution of institutional entitlements might provide an institutional 
                                                 
243 Compare Gary Lawson, Delegation and Nondelegation, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002) 
(no), with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 90, at 1721 (yes). While pitched in originalist, 
historical terms, the nondelegation debate is entangled with contemporaneous questions 
about the desirability of the federal regulatory state.  
244 Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101 (2004). 
245 Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME, 35, 38 
(Jon Elster & G. Loewenstein, eds., 1992); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1997) 
(noting “the settlement and coordination functions of law”).  
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grammar for future politics that stabilizes expectations and permits the 
development of democratic norms and traditions.246 Institutional stability 
might enable specific public goods such as accountability through regular 
elections. Further, it might enable the cultivation of private goods by 
allowing long-term planning to achieve slow-growing investments and life 
projects.247 On this view, an “important—perhaps the important—function 
of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done.”248 
Intermural bargaining should therefore be rejected because it unsettles 
expectations of what law is, where law comes from, and how law 
changes—and hence robs federal law and institutions of beneficial stability.  
 
 The argument from stability, if not without force, does not justify a 
categorical bar on institutional bargaining. To begin with, even accepting 
the proposition that institutional stability is required to secure public and 
private goods, it is not clear this warrants a bar on intermural bargaining. 
American constitutional history, as Part II demonstrated, is characterized by 
nontrivial levels of intermural bargaining, with concomitant shifts in 
responsibility for policies ratcheting between branches or rattling up and 
down between ladder between the national government and the states. If the 
basic stabilizing functions of a constitution were impeded by institutional 
bargaining, then the 1787 organic document would have failed to enable 
democratic norm development or effective private investment. The 
evidence, however, suggests otherwise for a number of reasons.  
 
First, it is hardly plain that some quantum of intermural bargaining 
is inimical to institutional stability. To be sure, if trades between institutions 
were sufficiently dense and frequent, voters might have difficulty 
determining how to allocate blame or praise for policy outcomes. Unable to 
predict which institutions would be responsible for regulation or taxation, 
long range planning would also be handicapped. Intermural bargaining, 
                                                 
246 STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
163 (1995) (comparing constitutional rules to grammatical rules, which “do not merely 
retrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do many things they would not otherwise 
have been able to do or even have thought of doing”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, The 
Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for 
Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003) (describing the 
Constitution as a “blueprint for democratic” governance). 
247 For a related idea, although specified with less detail, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE 
IN PLAINSCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 164 (2004) 
(arguing that “the Article V requirements for the amendment of the Constitution are an 
attractive part of the pragmatic justice-seeking quality to our constitutional institutions”). 
248 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 245, at 1377. 
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however, does not in fact occur at such a rapid clip. There is no reason to 
think voters are unable to understand the mechanics of stable, long-standing 
arrangements such as the administrative state or cooperative federalism. 
Second, even though the institutional locus of policymaking might shift 
over time, the existence of a stable national party system dampens the 
degree of policy oscillation by defining and limiting the field of policy 
contestation.249 Third, and relatedly, voters rely on partisan proxies and 
other heuristics in determining how to act at the ballot box.250 Democratic 
accountability is preserved so long as those proxies remain effective at 
aggregating information. There is no reason to think intermural bargaining 
generally undermines the epistemic value of democratic proxies.  
 
* * * 
 
In summary, categorical objections to institutional bargaining, either 
derived from a definition of constitutionalism or an account of the 
Constitution’s functions, ought to be rejected. At a high level of generality, 
there is no per se objection to institutional trades.  
 
B. The Inevitability of Institutional Bargaining  
 
 Whereas the previous section dispatched arguments against 
intermural bargaining, this section offers a positive case for the practice. I 
contend that bargaining of some sort is both inevitable and desirable for two 
reasons. First, the absence of complete specification of constitutional 
entitlements and spillover effects make bargaining unavoidable. Second, the 
Constitution is not a homeostatic system, but an evolutionary one. The 
inevitable translation of constitutional concepts forward in time against the 
backdrop of shifting institutional, social, and economic circumstances 
necessarily generates intermural conflicts even if the initial text has been 
                                                 
249 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2324-25 (2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials 
generally correlate more strongly with party than with branch.... [P]arty is likely to be the 
single best predictor of political agreement and disagreement.”). 
250 See Christopher Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, 
Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (2013) (noting that 
“political science has revealed certain mechanisms through which a low-information 
electorate may behave as if reasonably well informed,” most importantly, political parties). 
The positive epistemic effects of such heuristics, however, are not evenly distributed 
through the population. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
951, 955 (2001). 
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completely specified. Bargaining is needed to resolve these conflicts in the 
first instance. 
 
1. Spillovers between Constitutional Entitlements  
 
The Constitution is an incomplete contract in the sense that it does 
not resolve all potential questions concerning the allocation of 
endogenously defined entitlements.251 Like real property, questions about 
how to assign the costs of mitigating spillover effects arise. Unlike the real 
property context, the allocation of spillover-related costs will often lack a 
natural and intuitive answer. Instead, their resolution is best achieved 
through intermural bargaining.  
 
To see why the development of some mechanism for settling 
institutional boundary dispute questions that arise under the Constitution is 
inevitable, it is helpful to return to Ronald Coase’s examples of how 
ambiguity in real property entitlements arise: 
 
[A] confectioner … used two mortars and pestles in 
connection with his business (one had been in operation in 
the same position for more than 60 years and the other for 
more than 26 years). A doctor then came to occupy 
neighboring premises (in Wimpole Street). The 
confectioner's machinery caused the doctor no harm until, 
eight years after he had first occupied the premises, he built a 
consulting room at the end of his garden right against the 
confectioner's kitchen. It was then found that the noise and 
vibration caused by the confectioner's machinery made it 
difficult for the doctor to use his new consulting room.252 
 
Coase explained that the doctor secured an injunction against the noise, but 
then observed that this property entitlement could be bargained away if the 
confectioner’s use was more valuable. Further, had the case been resolved 
in favor of the confectioner, precisely the same kind of bargaining might 
                                                 
251 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice 
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L. J. 729, 730 (1991) (noting that the term “incomplete contract” 
can refer either to (1) obligational incompleteness, where a term (such as price or quantity 
in the ordinary contracting context) is not included, and (2) insufficient state contingency, 
because of a failure to fully realize the potential gains from trade in all future states of the 
world”).  
252 Coase, supra note 14, at 8–9 (discussing Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)). 
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also have occurred, with the entitlement still ending up in the hands of the 
party that valued it.253 This symmetry of outcomes under disparate legal 
rules yielded a lesson: In many cases in which the use of one entitlement 
has a spillover effect on the use of another entitlement, there is no obvious 
or natural or inevitable way to parcel out the entitlements. It is simply “not 
useful to speak of one party to an externality as being the cause of any 
problem of incompatible demands.” 254 
 
Spillover effects of the kind Coase identified are not limited to 
doctors and confectioners. There are many instances in which one 
institution’s exercise of a structural entitlement will interact with another 
institution’s exercise of an entitlement, and where the “default package of 
entitlements” described in the constitutional text provide no obvious or 
natural benchmark for resolving the conflict.255 In such spillover cases, 
something more than mere excavation of the constitutional text is required 
to justify an outcome. Intermural negotiation, similar to the sort that Coase 
predicts arising between the doctor and the confectioner, provides an 
obvious means of resolving the context and allocating the disputed right to 
its highest value user. In these spillover cases, intermural bargaining 
provides a device for allocating interests.  
 
The existence of intermural spillovers in the absence of any such 
intuitive or obvious default disposition can be illustrated with examples 
from both federalism and separation of powers domains. Spillover effects 
are pervasive in a geographic federation in which member states are 
contiguous with each other and jurisdictional lines are porous. The Court’s 
Dormant Commerce Clause case law, which targets state enactments that 
dampen the flow of interstate commerce, is an effort to manage trade-
                                                 
253 Id. For Coase, a simple social welfare function determined the right’s optimal 
assignment. Id. at 27 (“What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the 
harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the 
action which produces the harm.”). 
254 Merrill & Smith, Coasean Property, supra note 35, at S91. Merrill and Smith point out 
that the situation is arguably different in the real property context, because in rem property 
rights are “goods against the world” and so have “a built in asymmetry.” Id. at S92. (And 
so the judges thought in Sturges. See A.W.B. Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 53, 90 (1996)). Their epistemic transaction-cost justification for this position, 
however, does not translate into the public law context. Put otherwise, there is no public 
law analog to the “strongly locational nature of the parties’ rights” in real property law. 
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 1001–02 (2004). 
255 Thomas W. Merrill, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 
1861 (2007). 
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related spillovers between states and to maintain a national market.256 
Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is a mechanism for citizens 
of one state to remedy disabilities imposed by citizens of another.257 
 
Spillovers effects also occur between states and the federal 
government. The constitutional text’s failure to provide any simple rule for 
allocating spillover costs between the states and the national government 
was at issue in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona.258 At issue there, 
as noted previously, was a provision of the NVRA requiring states to 
“accept and use” federal voter registration forms.259 Although Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion resolved the case on statutory interpretation 
grounds, the nub of the case involved a conflict between two constitutional 
entitlements. On the one hand, Congress’s authority pursuant to the 
Elections Clause allows it to “make or alter” any state law concerning the 
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives.”260 On the other hand, the states maintain authority to 
determine “the composition of the federal electorate.”261 Intergovernmental 
frictions arise because time, place, and manner regulations—such as the 
NVRA’s streamlined framework for by-mail voter registration—necessary 
alter the composition of the voting electorate by lowering or raising the cost 
of accessing the polls. Less costly registration enlarges the pool of expected 
voters, and vice versa. The Constitution distinguishes between federal laws 
that regulate the time, place, and manner of voting, and state laws 
concerning the composition of the electorate as if these were hermetically 
                                                 
256 See Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual 
Mandate, 100 GEO. L. J. 1117, 1121 (2012) (arguing that “the criterion separating 
successful and unsuccessful Commerce Clause challenges is whether the contested law 
implicates only economic externalities, meaning effects on private parties, or implicates 
political externalities, meaning effects on the laws of other states”). For an argument that 
some of the case law can be explained as an effort to realize positive network externalities, 
see Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 112–15 (2004). Of course, 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence may fail to give a full account of all relevant 
spillovers. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L. J. 785, 798 (2001) (arguing for a need to theorize better 
“state regulation of cross-border externalities”).  
257 See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional 
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1584 (2005) (explaining that the Clause 
“counteract[s] the political malfunction of spillover effects”).  
258133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). 
259 See supra text accompanying notes 175 to 179. 
260 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. 
261 133 S. Ct. at 2257–58 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1). 
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sealed categories. As the NVRA shows, that boundary is elusive. Like 
Coase’s doctor and confectionary, the national government and the states 
are locked in a bilateral relationship in which plenary employment of one 
party’s powers necessarily impinges on plenary employment of others’ 
authorities.  
 
Similar ambiguities in the boundaries between different institutions’ 
constitutional entitlements can be found in separation of powers contexts. 
For example, the Court’s removal jurisprudence is animated by the overlap 
of the President’s power to take care laws are enforced and Congress’s 
power pursuant to the horizontal component of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to structure the executive branch.262 To analyze removal disputes as 
raising solely the powers of one or the other elected branch is to gloss over 
the question of how institutional borders are to be drawn when the text 
engenders overlap.263 It is to assume, rather than reason out, an answer.  
 
Spillovers also underlie cases such as Chadha v. INS264 and Bowsher 
v. Synar.265 As framed by the Court, both cases hinged on a conceptual 
distinction between legislative functions and executive functions. In 
Chadha, the Court characterized the “altering [of] legal rights, duties and 
relations” as “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”266 In Bowsher, it 
stated that “[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the 
legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law,”267 and 
hence a task for Article II authorities alone. A spillover arises because 
interpreting a law often necessarily means changing rights and duties. 
Hence, the (forbidden) application of the legislative veto against Mr. 
Chadha is also an interpretation of the immigration statute. The budgetary 
reductions that would have been effected by the Comptroller General under 
the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act also altered 
“rights, duties and relations” by changing the fiscal entitlements of diverse 
federal grantees. At least as defined by the Court in those cases, putatively 
                                                 
262 See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3165 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that removal cases arise at “the intersection of 
two general constitutional principles,” the Take Care Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause).  
263 Hence, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Free Enterprise Fund begins with Take Care 
clause, and then never fairly accounts for the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 3146. 
264 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
265 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
266 462 U.S. at 951–52. 
267 478 U.S. at 733. 
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mutually exclusive core functions of the legislature and the executive 
overlap.268  
 
The concepts of ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ cannot be applied to 
the complexities of observed governance in ways that yield resolving 
clarity.269 As Justice Stevens recognized in Bowsher, “governmental power 
cannot always be readily characterized with only one of ... three labels.”270 
To be sure, there are other ways of reconciling Bowsher and Chadha. Both 
cases, the Court later noted, disapprove congressional self-
aggrandizement.271 But that reconciliation does not undermine my point 
here: Efforts by the Court to determine whether and how to separate 
government functions have dominated debates in constitutional theory since 
the Founding. But absent some even deeper account decomposing those 
elementary particles yet further, boundary disputes will remain pervasive.272  
 
These examples demonstrate that constitutional entitlements, like 
real property, generate spillover problems that can be characterized as either 
A’s interference with B or B’s interference with A. This would have not 
surprised the Framers. James Madison, most famously, prophesized that the 
Constitution would be “more or less obscure and equivocal, until [its] 
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions 
                                                 
268 This is not a new observation. Magill, Real Separation, supra note 22, at 1141–42 
(2000); H. Jefferson Powell & Jed Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on Line 
Item Vetoes and Separation of Powers, 47 DUKE L. J. 1171, 1199 (1998).  
269 See Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
343, 343 (1989) (“[R]igid categories of branch power simplistically disregard the real 
complexities of government structure as we know it ....”). 
270 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 750 
(noting that “[t]he powers delegated to the Comptroller General by §251 of the Act... have 
a... chameleon-like quality”). 
271 As indeed the Court did. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) 
(characterizing both cases as involving congressional self-aggrandizement); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1238 (1995). 
272 Such accounts often rest on controversial claims about the original public meaning of 
Article II. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 215, 216–17 (2005) (“Congress lacks a generic right to reallocate or tamper with 
presidential powers.”). Without recapitulating the extensive debate about such claims, it 
suffices here to say that they are nonobvious, methodologically controversial, and hence 
hardly as crisp in their resolution as their proponents would like to think. For every 
originalist assertion in favor of Article I, the non-originalist reader might indeed posit a 
natural law demanding an equal and opposition on behalf of Article II. Or, if one prefers, 
originalism largely works by bypassing the definitional enterprise of Chadha and Bowsher 
to raid the ice box of history for useful boundary lines. 
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and adjudications.”273 As Madison’s dictum suggests, some mechanism for 
resolving boundary disputes is inevitable. At least to date, the elected 
branches and the states have principally resorted to bargaining as an 
expeditious and inexpensive means to resolve disputes. Absent some reason 
to think that this tradition has always been wrong-headed or misguided, the 
persistence of spillover problems provides a threshold reason for accepting 
intermural bargaining as a legitimate constitutional practice.  
 
2. The Myth of Constitutional Homeostasis 
 
 Bargaining is useful for a second reason. Even if the Constitution 
perfectly specified institutional entitlements, ambiguity in boundaries would 
remain unavoidable due to institutional, social, and economic change over 
time. Bargaining is a logical, and historically tested, mechanism for dealing 
with the changes thereby wrought to institutional boundaries.  
 
The Constitution, unlike the human body, is not homeostatic.274 Its 
internal shifts are invisible vectors that over generations thrust into conflict 
previously isolate institutions. That “changed circumstances” might alter 
structural constitutional relations is, of course, a familiar idea.275 The 
national economy, for example, has transformed itself—dilating westward, 
congealing into new corporate forms, molting with each rise and fall of a 
new transportation or communication technology—belying the idea of a 
delimited Commerce Clause power.276 As the nation’s geopolitical 
aspirations have swelled with shifting ideologies and aspirations,277 and the 
United States has shifted “from inwardness and isolation into the dominant 
world power,”278 so the balance of power between the executive and 
Congress has recalibrated. New external pressures alter not just the 
interbranch balance, but also the national government’s relations with the 
                                                 
273 THE FEDERALIST 37, at 244–45 (James Madison) (I. Kramnick, ed. 1987). 
274 Cf. ARTHUR C. GUYTON & JOHN E. HALL, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 7-8 
(10th ed. 2000) (“Each functional structure provides its share in the maintenance of 
homeostatic conditions .... Extreme dysfunction leads to death, whereas moderate 
dysfunction leads to sickness.”). 
275 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
125, 132 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 453–72 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 
71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
276 MICHAEL LIND, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2012). 
277 GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 
1776 (2011). 
278 G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 1 (2011). 
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states.279 Nor have the background assumptions of democracy remained 
constant. Rather, the (long delayed) entrance of women and people of color 
into the polity have transformed the electorate beyond early republican 
recognition.280 Even the background assumptions of constitutional order are 
subject to sub rosa transformations: Recent scholarship suggests that basic 
assumptions about federalism’s inherent logic were not immutable through 
even the early Republic.281  
 
All these changes impact the scope and operation of structural 
constitutional entitlements. It is standard to assume that subsequent 
constitutional interpreters should seek “to restore the status quo” out of 
fidelity to the original design.282 But it is not clear this is so. It may be that 
original institutional equilibria cannot be recreated without minatory social 
costs. For example, narrowing Congress’s Commerce power to antebellum 
dimensions might cripple the national economy. The national regulatory 
state also cannot be undone without large economic disruption. The task of 
resolving new institutional conflicts, in short, is not well described as an 
exercise in fidelity. Rather, as exogenous historical change presses into 
conflict institutional entitlements that previously stood apart, resolution of 
those conflicts must attend not only to historical warrants but also to present 
social goods. As Part II demonstrated, it has been intermural bargaining that 
has played the critical role in efforts to maintain the Constitution as a going 
concern. 
 
Intermural bargaining is an especially salient channel for 
institutional dispute resolution given the preclusive difficulty of 
                                                 
279 See Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 
66 VAND. L. REV. 723 (2013) (developing the claim that external geopolitical forces are an 
important determinant of structural constitutional outcomes). 
280 See ALEXANDER KEYSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).  
281 See, e.g., Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 112 YALE 
L. J. 1104, 1171–81 (2013). 
282 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 476, 492 (2011); accord Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the 
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2009) (explaining that translation theory 
recommends that “the original meaning of the Constitution's structure might best be 
preserved by departures from the specific original understandings of the founding 
generation”); accord Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential 
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 129 (1994). But see David A. Strauss, The 
Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2009) 
(identifying doctrinal areas in which the Court has tried to “moderniz[e]” doctrine in 
response to perceived public opinion). 
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constitutional change through Article V.283 Unable to adjust the text through 
Article V without exorbitant transaction costs, institutions have strong 
incentives to bargain among themselves to reach stable outcomes. 
Paradoxically, negotiated change may stabilize the overall constitutional 
dispensation by staving off economic or social crisis. On this view, stability 
under conditions of social, economic, and geopolitical flux is not obtained 
by resisting new institutional arrangements. Rather, it is secured by 
allowing elected officials to experiment with new governance mechanisms.  
 
C. Judicial Review as a Substitute for Bargaining  
 
The fact that intermural boundaries inevitably overlap, generating 
conflicts with no obvious resolution, does not lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that bargaining is the optimal resolution mechanism for the 
ensuing disputes. An alternative institutional mechanism might dominate 
bargaining in terms of cost and accuracy. An obvious contender is judicial 
review. A case for judicial primacy in resolving intermural disputes might 
start with the observation that federal courts sooner or later do confront and 
adjudicate the constitutionality of many, if not all, institutional boundary 
questions that might otherwise be resolved by intermural bargaining.284 
Why not then just cut to the chase? Prioritization of judicial action might be 
grounded on comparative institutional competence grounds. Federal courts 
lack an institutional stake in many structural constitutional disputes. Courts’ 
impartiality makes them especially well-situated to act as arbiters in 
interbranch or intergovernmental conflicts.285 Further, judicial review does 
not suffer from a potential distortion manifested in intermural bargaining. 
Institutions trade over constitutional entitlements in the absence of the thick 
array of buyers and sellers commonly thought necessary to well-functioning 
markets.286 As a result, bargaining failures and difficulties in valuing 
institutional assets might prevent socially desirable transfers from 
occurring. 
 
This section considers and rejects the possibility that courts should 
be favored forums for resolving intermural boundary disputes. It develops 
                                                 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 220 to 222. 
284 See generally supra Part II. 
285 For a similar claim, see Committee on the Judiciary v Miers, 558 F Supp. 2d 53, 56, 76, 
96, 103, 107 (D.D.C. 2008) (referring to the judiciary as the “ultimate arbiter” of executive 
privilege claims). 
286 Cf. Lee Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1438 (2009) 
(describing the problem of the “‘thin market’in which transactions must occur, if at all, 
between specific parties”). 
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four reasons for rejecting the primacy of judicial resolution. These 
arguments will be supplemented in Part IV, which argues further that courts 
are ill-positioned to determine whether the conditions for resisting 
intermural negotiation are satisfied in respect to particular deals. To be 
clear, my claim here is not that courts should have no role at all. The use of 
courts as backstopping venues for the resolution of some constitutional 
questions is deeply embedded in our constitutional disposition. I focus here 
instead on reasons for relegating courts to a distinctly second tier.   
 
As a threshold matter, Article III of the Constitution has been read to 
bar federal courts from acting in the absence of a concrete dispute.287 To 
obtain a judicial resolution in the absence of bargaining, therefore, one 
institution would have to infringe on another’s putative prerogatives to 
precipitate a justiciable dispute. But despite Corwin’s famous dictum, the 
separation of powers is not in practice an “invitation to struggle.”288 Instead, 
“[v]iolations of separation of powers principles tend to occur with the 
consent of two branches rather than unilateral incursion by one.”289 No 
mechanism in the Constitution ensures that the transient, elected occupants 
of federal or state offices will be empire-builders keen to extend their 
demesnes.290 Accordingly, a mechanism for resolving institutional 
ambiguities that relies on aggressive intramural incursions as a necessary 
predicate for clarification would founder on incentive compatibility 
grounds. Further, requiring branches and states to instigate contentious 
border disputes may create more litigation-related and frictional costs that 
bargaining obviates. There is no obvious reason why those costs should be 
incurred in every case, as opposed to solely those cases in which intermural 
bargaining breaks down. 
 
Second, the tools that courts employ to resolve institutional border 
disputes may be clumsy, costly, and prone to manipulation—and so not 
necessarily superior to institutional bargaining. Rather than conducing to 
uncertainty, their persistent deployment may destabilize expectations of 
institutional behavior. As this Part has demonstrated, many institutional 
                                                 
287 See Federal Election Com'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998) (noting that “courts 
will not ‘pass upon ... abstract, intellectual problems’” (citation omitted)). 
288 Corwin was only talking about foreign policy. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: 
OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
289 Gersen supra note 81, at 356 n.147. 
290 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 915, 920 (2005) (arguing that officials often act based on personal and political 
incentives that do not entail defending institutional powers and prerogatives of the branch 
that employs them). 
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border disputes arise when neither constitutional text nor original 
understanding provide univocal answers. As a result, judicial resolution of 
intermural border disputes tends to pivot on contentious, highly 
controverted theories of constitutional interpretation. In Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council of Arizona, for example, Justice Thomas suggested that an 
appropriate default rule could be deduced from the anti-centripal logic of 
the Founding moment.291 On Justice Thomas’s account, that resolving 
default rule arises not from the text but from a contested historical account 
of the federal government’s formation and a highly controversial political 
theory of divided sovereignty. In an earlier case, Justice Stevens had set 
forth an alternative theory of the Constitution’s implicit political theory 
(one that is perhaps no less controversial) that would yield different answers 
to the boundary question.292  
 
It is by no means clear that recourse to grand constitutional theory is 
a superior decisional procedure to bargaining. Disputes that turn on 
historical evidence and constitutional theory will tend to be expensive to 
litigate. Ex ante, they produce uncertainty. There is also no guarantee that 
dueling grand theories of constitutional design yield anything other than a 
“draw.”293 On the contrary, observed patterns of ideological voting on the 
Supreme Court may raise a concern that the wide array of historical, 
theoretical, and precedential material from which answers can be derived 
leaves large free rein for judges’ priors.294 As a result, reliance on grand 
theory to settle institutional border disputes might undermine the 
predictability of dispute resolution. Judicial resolution, in short, is not 
necessarily a stabilizing force.  
 
Third, if intermural settlements of institutional boundary disputes 
are largely consensual (as appears to be the case), it may well be that those 
who challenge them in court are either disgruntled defectors295 or third 
                                                 
291 See 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263–64 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 864–65 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
292 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 798–805 (Stevens, J.).  
293 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995). 
294 For empirical evidence of ideological voting, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES 
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006). 
295 Such as New York state in respect to the LLRWPA. See supra text accompanying notes 
181to185.  
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parties with an ulterior agenda.296 Rather than selecting for cases in which 
an institutional settlement is most troubling, the ensuing pattern of 
challenges to intermural bargains will result in challenges against 
institutional fixes from defectors or rent-seeking private litigants. In this 
way, litigation is most likely to occur when a structural fix has resulted in 
relatively large welfare gains by eliminating significant rent-seeking. 
Litigation is least likely to be observed, by contrast, when an institutional 
fixes has had negligible effects, or it has welfare-dampening effects and 
potential spoilers have been bought off.  
 
Therefore, in cases in which an intermural bargain is an effort to 
extract rents, say from the general populace, it will be possible to buy off all 
internal defectors and hostile interest groups with a portion of those rents. 
By contrast, when an intermural settlement is beneficial to the public at 
large, there will likely not be resources freed up to pay for bribes to head off 
hostile law suits. But if courts are most likely to pick off those institutional 
settlements that are most valuable, and least likely to deal with normatively 
troubling deals, we might fairly doubt that they are the optimal site for 
resolution of institutional boundary disputes in constitutional law. Again, 
this suggests courts’ role should be a secondary one.  
 
Fourth, the comparative epistemic competence case in favor of 
judicial primacy is hard to sustain. On the one hand, judges’ impartiality is 
easy to exaggerate. Federal courts do not stand in perfect equipoise between 
Congress and the executive. Of course, Congress has authority to recalibrate 
the scope of federal-court jurisdiction and judicial budgets. But this does 
not guarantee a level interbranch playing field.297 Empirical studies confirm 
that the identity of the appointing President has an outsize influence on 
judges’ subsequent voting behavior.298 So great is the “predictive success of 
                                                 
296 See Huq, Standing, supra note 24, at -- (analyzing the political economy of standing in 
structural constitutional cases to suggest that individual litigants will often have ulterior 
agendas at odds with social welfare). 
297 Congress cannot, however, disturb final judgments. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 
U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995). 
298 Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, The Influence of Presidential Versus Home 
State Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on the United States District 
Courts, 36 LAW & SOC. REV. 657, 666 (2002) (expecting to find “that the practice of 
senatorial courtesy might lead to judicial appointments consistent with the views of home 
state senators” but discovering that “presidential preference is more than twice as 
influential as home state senatorial preferences”). This is hardly surprising. See Byron J. 
Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of 
Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1071 (1999) (“Given the 
Court's key role in setting public policy, the president will want a Court that shares his 
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the presidential-appointment measure of [judicial] ideology,” that many 
studies use it without detailed comment.299 In addition to this ex ante bias in 
favor of the appointing President, the executive has important ex post 
opportunities to influence judges. For example, federal courts rely on the 
President and his or her officials for enforcement of their orders.300 Judges 
may also be cognizant of the power that the President has to veto 
jurisdiction-stripping proposals, and otherwise to protect the institutional 
and fiscal resources of the courts.301 Given that these ex ante and ex post 
pressures both tilt toward the executive and away from other branches, it 
seems fair to ask why one would expect federal courts to be neutral as 
between Congress and the White House. The same point can be made more 
parsimoniously respecting federalism: As their name suggests, the federal 
courts are not situated in equipoise between the states and the national 
government. Even the Justices’ occasional federalism enthusiasms can be 
traced back to changes in the preferences of national political actors.302 
Accordingly, there is no strong reason to anticipate consistent neutrality 
between levels of government on the part of Article III courts. 
 
Any argument for preferring political branch bargaining over 
judicial settlement must also account for the strengths and weaknesses of 
nonjudicial settlement. In contrast to judicial resolution, intermural 
bargaining may function tolerably well in a significant proportion of cases. 
To be sure, the absence of a thick market and price mechanism for 
institutional bargaining may mean that some socially desirable bargains do 
not occur.303 While this might justify reliance on judicial review as a 
                                                                                                                            
ideology and thus will nominate someone who will bring the Court closer to his 
preferences.”). 
299 Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 279 & n.105 
(2005). 
300 But see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801-02 (1987) 
(holding that courts can initiate their own contempt proceedings). 
301 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 250 (2012) (providing examples of cases in which presidents opposed jurisdiction-
stripping measures). 
302 See Mitchell J. Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and the Political 
Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 22 (2004). 
303 Institutional entitlements, to be sure, are incommensurable—but so too are many items 
subject to ordinary market transactions (think, for example, of the trade-off between 
marginal wages for longer working hours and time with family). Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 782–85 (1994) 
(illustrating the pervasiveness of incommensurability problems in valuing private market 
goods).  
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complement to institutional bargaining, it does not undermine the utility of 
observed intermural resolutions.  
 
Further, there is no reason for categorical skepticism of elected 
actors’ incentives. The practice of serious constitutionalism within elected 
bodies in the United States has a long historical pedigree. The first 
Congresses took the task of constitutional interpretation seriously without 
being hamstrung by institutional or partisan bias.304 Today, this practice, 
which is known as departmentalism, has many academic defenders.305 The 
robustness of that departmentalist tradition contrasts with the relatively 
recent vintage of claims to judicial supremacy.306 Setting these two histories 
alongside each other, it becomes clear that the role of courts as neutral 
arbiters of intermural disputes is historically contingent, dating back to the 
Civil War.307 The institutions originally vested with institutional 
entitlements by the Constitution managed to resolve intermural disputes for 
decades before the courts ever got involved. While the benefits of judicial 
involvement may be overstated, the costs of elected branch resolution also 
seem smaller than might first appear. Without resolving all of the hard 
normative questions raised by departmentalism, it is plausible to conclude 
that when there are multiple branches or governments bargaining over an 
entitlement, there is no reason to think that courts should be necessary 
forums for constitutional resolution because of their putative impartiality.  
 
This evaluation of judicial settlement’s limitations and intermural 
bargaining’s advantages reflects contemporary constitutional adjudicatory 
practice. For while federal judges presently employ no systemic theory of 
intermural bargaining—indeed, they do not even recognize that the 
phenomenon cuts across transubstantive lines—they nonetheless tend to 
approach voluntary settlement of institutional boundary lines with a 
deferential attitude. The judicial posture of deference evinced toward such 
settlements—while rebuttable, as shown by cases such as Chadha, 
                                                 
304 See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997) (demonstrating breadth of constitutional interpretation by early 
Congresses). 
305 Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1001, 1075–76 (2012) [hereinafter Huq, Enforcing] (collecting empirical evidence to that 
effect). 
306 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 
1153–56 (2009) (noting recent vintage of such claims to judicial supremacy). 
307 See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (2012) 
(documenting historical patterns in judicial willingness to invalidate federal statutes on 
constitutional grounds, and showing large increase in such settlement after the Civil War). 
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Bowsher, and Clinton—appropriately reflects the epistemic and institutional 
constraints of judicial review, in addition to the merits of intermural 
settlement. To be sure, one cannot reason from observed practice to 
normative prescription without committing the naturalistic fallacy. 
Nevertheless, courts’ frequent deference to bargained-for institutional 
outcomes suggests that a regime of limited judicial superintendence does 
not produce intolerable outcomes.308 Judicial deference instead reflects the 
well-founded view that “acquiesced-in government practices … embody 
wisdom accumulated over time and are unlikely to threaten the basic 
balance of power between Congress and the Executive.”309  
 
In sum, the limits of judicial capacity and the merits of intermural 
bargaining undermine the case for judicial exclusivity, even if they do not 
establish that courts should play no role at all. As a result, there is no reason 
to think that courts should always be preferred forums for the resolution of 
intermural boundary disputes. Instead, courts should treat the outcomes of 
such negotiation with at least a measure of deference in recognition of 
elected actors’ primacy.  
 
* * * 
 
There is no cause to lament the fact that bargaining over institutional 
entitlements is inevitable. The Constitution’s textual specification of 
institutional entitlements is inevitably incomplete. Hydraulic pressures 
imposed by economic, institutional, and geopolitical change inexorably 
foster new institutional tensions. Nor is there reason to appeal to the 
judiciary as the default arbiter of institutional boundary disputes. To the 
contrary, the arguments marshaled in this Part suggest that intermural 
bargaining should be the default mechanism for renegotiating the 
boundaries between institutions vested with constitutional entitlements. 
Federal judges should review the outcomes of intermural bargaining only 
deferentially. Just as in the private market context, that is, Coasean 
bargaining should be approved as a favored means for identifying the 
optimal location of an entitlement.  
                                                 
308 Courts have also acquiesced wholesale to intermural settlements by installing the 
political question doctrine as a barrier to justiciability in many disputes about structural 
boundaries. See Huq, Removal, supra note 24, at 20–24. 
309 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 103, at 414. For the link between comparative 
institutional competence arguments and the Legal Process approach, see HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 696, 1009-10, 1111 (William Eskridge, Jr. 
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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IV. The Limits of Intermural Bargaining  
 
 A presumption in favor of intermural bargaining need not, though, 
be conclusive. Even if intra- or intergovernmental negotiation generates 
beneficial outcomes in the mine run of cases, it may nonetheless 
periodically yield socially undesirable results. This Part develops two 
criteria for determining whether a structural constitutional bargain should be 
prohibited and considers whether either criteria provides a platform for 
judicial review. In the first task, my argument here mines the private law 
framework sketched in Part I and applied in Part III. Using that body of 
rules as a template, I propose that the categories of negative externalities 
and paternalism can, mutatis mutandi, serve as limits on institutional 
bargaining. In the ordinary contracting context, both concepts are informed 
by models of individual behavior.310 I do not assume these models 
mechanically translate into the institutional context, where psychological 
and decisional dynamics will be quite different. Rather, I endeavor to 
demonstrate that the same concepts furnish traction in the institutional 
context given the nature of institutional decision-making. 
 
The identification of limits to permissible intermural negotiations 
again implicates the question whether courts should police bargains. 
Building on the discussion in Part III.C, I suggest reasons to be skeptical 
that courts will identify accurately instances in which institutional bargains 
go too far. I examine instances in which the Court has imposed 
inalienablility rules, focusing on largely separation of powers cases where 
the Court has been most active in this regard.311 Based on this analysis, I 
suggest that the inalienability rules should not have been imposed in leading 
cases such as Chadha v. INS,312 Bowsher v. Synar,313 and Clinton v. New 
York.314 Moreover, courts have tended to assign excessive weight to shifts 
in regulatory entitlements achieved through custom or historical gloss. This 
track record again undermines courts’ primacy in regulating intermural 
                                                 
310 See, e.g., Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, supra note 48, at 1838–42 (organizing 
discussion of paternalism around models of cognitive failure).  
311 Recall that in federalism cases, the Court has focused on defining property rights via the 
commandeering doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity doctrine. See 
supra text accompanying notes 154 to 160. This jurisprudence is largely in harmony with 
the Coasean logic advanced in this Article, although it has been subject to criticism on 
other grounds. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz 
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998). 
312 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
313 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
314 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
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bargaining and reinforces the case for judicial deference. Accordingly, 
platforms for judicial intervention may exist, but they should be employed 
with care and deference.  
 
A. Negative Externalities  
 
 I first specify the possibility that limits on intermural bargaining 
might be justified by a concern about negative externalities, and consider 
whether courts are well-positioned to enforce such limits. Institutional 
frameworks established in the Constitution, such as the separation of 
powers and federalism, are justified in terms of their beneficial effects for 
citizens.315 According to the Supreme Court, both of these structural 
principles engender individual liberty by minimizing the monopoly power 
of any one governmental entity.316 By dispersing power between plural 
institutional sites, the Constitution diminishes the risk of tyranny and 
promotes limited government.317 A first argument for limiting intermural 
bargaining would focus on the possibility that the ensuing deals 
compromised these positive externalities of the Constitution’s architecture. 
 
Note that this argument does not suggest that any perceived third-
party harm justifies a constraint on intermural bargaining. It suggests rather 
that when a value that the Constitution specifically seeks to promote (such 
as accountability or liberty) is compromised by an institutional innovation, 
the innovation producing such an effect should be treated with suspicion. 
Sometimes, intermural deals can be struck precisely to assign economic 
harms in the most efficient manner way possible. The LLRWPA may be a 
good example of this.318 Hence, the mere fact that some private parties are 
disadvantaged by a deal in some way is not sufficient to warrant its close 
                                                 
315 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“[I]ndividuals, too, are protected 
by the operations of separation of powers and checks and balances; and they are not 
disabled from relying on those principles in otherwise justiciable cases and 
controversies.”); accord New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).  
316 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights under Federalism, 55 L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
147, 149-50 (1992) (discussing how federalism checks state monopoly power by allowing 
exit rights); Linda D. Jellum, ‘‘Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? 
When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 878-79 
(2009) (arguing that separation of powers jurisprudence aims to protect liberty by 
preventing “tyranny and legislative aggrandizement”).  
317 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth of 
this country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty.”).  
318 See supra text accompanying notes 180 to 185. 
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scrutiny. There must be reason to believe a constitutional value is 
compromised.  
 
An externalities-based justification for placing certain institutional 
deals beyond bounds might start from the observation that some 
institutional deals redound to the detriment of the public as a result of 
elected representatives’ misbegotten incentives. Agency slack leads 
faithless elected agents to endorse institutional deals with negative 
externalities. Those agents defect due to self-interest, divergent preferences, 
or a want of information or skill.319 But democratic politics at both federal 
and state levels employ regular elections to cabin agency slack. Hence, an 
externalities-based argument for limiting intermural bargaining must also 
explain why elections insufficiently discipline officials in dealmaking with 
other institutions.320  
 
The concept of negative externalities, in short, can be translated into 
the structural constitutional context. But how should it be enforced? One 
starting point in answering this question is the Court’s separation of powers 
case-law, which can be explained in terms of externalities. Examination of 
those cases, however, suggests that courts have considerable difficulty 
accurately identifying plausible, externality-derived limits on bargaining, 
and at minimum should proceed with caution when acting on the belief that 
they have such a case at bar.  
 
First, the limits on delegation in Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton all 
echo a numerus clausus principle, i.e., a limit on the variety of forms 
property interests can take.321 In real property law, the numerus clausus 
principle is justified on the ground that “[s]tandardization of property rights 
reduces [the] measurement costs” of third parties by eliminating the 
prospect of idiosyncratically defined entitlements.322 By analogy, 
prohibitions on legislative vetoes, lockbox rules, and line-item vetoes might 
be justified in terms of negative epistemic spillover: Each institutional 
innovation tampers with the channels of democratic accountability. It thus 
raises the cost to voters of observing individual politicians. Just as the 
                                                 
319 Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 203, 207, 209-10 (2005). 
320 TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD 
GOVERNMENT 105-06 (2006) (explaining that agency slack between voters and their 
representatives is typically addressed through either the mechanism of ex ante electoral 
selection effects or through retrospective voting). 
321 See text accompanying supra note 107. 
322 Merrill & Smith, Coasean Property, supra note 35, at 9. 
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Court’s hostility to some campaign finance regulation is explained by a 
wish to clear channels of political competition, so these separation-of-
powers rules serve to promote accountability by cabining the costs of 
deriving a national policy’s etiology.323  
 
Second, and alternatively, the results in these cases might be 
defended on the ground that each of these institutional innovations 
concentrates power, thwarting the Constitution’s reliance on fragmented 
governmental power as a means to producing the rule of law by 
disregarding strict acoustic separations between distinct species of 
governmental power.324 In this way, these decisions lower the barriers to 
tyranny developing within the constitutional framework as a consequence of 
one branch seizing an inordinate share of power. Hence, Chadha, Bowsher, 
and Clinton might be read to impose inalienability rules when negative 
liberty-related externalities outweigh the benefits of intermural deal-
making.  
 
It is worth reiterating that it is no doubt true that certain intermural 
deals should be prohibited due to negative externalities. But I am skeptical 
that the Court has successfully identified instances in which such a ban is 
warranted. Neither the democratic accountability nor the anti-tyranny 
accounts of Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton are persuasive. First, a 
democratic accountability defense of those cases necessarily rests upon 
some estimate of voter confusion, the availability of proxies for voters, and 
the offsetting benefits of institutional displacement. Such a defense would 
also need to account for the possibility that the challenged institutional 
modifications might in some instances lower the costs of democratic 
accountability. The line-item veto, for example, might ease democratic 
accountability by “improv[ing] the transparency of budget decisions to 
voters.”325 Yet the Court’s decisions are bereft of the necessary empirical 
investigations necessary to justify its conclusion that the institutional 
innovations in Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton in fact undermined 
democratic accountability 
 
                                                 
323 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998). A similar argument is offered in 
favor of the anticommandeering rule. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,168-69, 182-83(1992).  
324 See Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
433, 440 (2013) (“[T]he separation of powers might be thought of as a means to the 
division of power.”).  
325 Garrett, Accountability and Restraint, supra note 118, at 873. 
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Furthermore, arguments against the legislative veto, sequester, and 
line-item veto from liberty externalities also founder on profound 
conceptual difficulties and empirical uncertainty. It is very plausible to 
think that the correlation between liberty and mandated separations of 
institutional power is, in fact, very weak.326 I therefore doubt the threshold 
assumption that separated powers consistently produce positive externalities 
to begin with. Even setting aside that possibility, the outcomes in these 
cases are hard to justify. The Court simply lacked any warrant for 
concluding that the institutional innovations it has struck down diminish 
rather than augment liberty interests. Hence, even as interbranch 
consolidation of power enlarges government power, it might do so by 
reducing rent-seeking and increasing the rationality and predictability of 
federal action.327 These liberty-promoting effects might dominate any loss 
in liberty from the concentration of government power. In the same way, 
election rules that “entrench one vision of democracy,”328 and so protect 
incumbents, also create the stability and predictability necessary for 
democracy. In both contexts, agency costs might be smaller than stability 
and predictability gains.329 Further, even brief reflection on the history of 
federal interventions on civil rights issues should reveal that centralizing 
power can sometimes redistribute liberty interests between different social 
groups so as to expand the net enjoyment of liberty under the 
Constitution—not to mention leaving that liberty allocated in more just 
arrangements.  
 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to get more traction on the idea of 
externalities from institutional deals by considering the possibility that 
elected agents will be most likely to self-deal when there is unified rather 
                                                 
326 See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
887, 923–24 (2012) (developing this point for national security policy); Huq, Standing, 
supra note 24, at – (developing the point more generally); see also ERIC A. POSNER & 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 176–
204 (2010) (offering empirical evidence that fears of institutional tyranny tend to be 
overstated). 
327 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 100 (1985) (“[D]elegation to experts [is] a form of 
consensus building that, far from taking decisions out of politics, seeks to give political 
choice a form in which potential collective agreement can be discovered and its benefits 
realized.”). 
328 Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. 
REV. 95, 135 (2003). 
329 Professor Waldron aligns the separation of powers with the rule of law. See Waldron, 
supra note 324, at 456–59. This analysis, by contrast, shows how violating a pure 
separation of powers can promote some rule of law values.  
 64 
 
than divided government. Deals with potential institutional competitors 
might be a way for incumbents to reduce the risk that malfeasance, rent-
seeking or neglect will come to voters’ attention through institutional 
conflict and competition.330 This would suggest that courts should look 
especially closely at deals struck by institutions controlled by the same 
political party, and allow bipartisan deals (such as the line-item veto and the 
original legislative veto) a greater margin of appreciation. 
 
In sum, negative externalities sounding in liberty terms may well 
supply a justification for some inalienability rules. But specification of such 
a limit demands careful empirical evaluation of a law’s effect upon 
democratic accountability and other important values. The Court is not 
clearly well-placed to engage in this sort of predictive and wide-ranging 
inquiry. The Court’s interventions in Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton cannot 
be defended as reasoned and informed evaluations of negative externalities. 
More generally, federal judges are poorly positioned to ascertain when an 
institutional bargain creates negative externalities. And they may be 
discomforted by the need to treat divided and unified government as 
constitutionally distinct. Instead, it should be up to officials, and their 
constituents, to ascertain in the first instance when institutional bargains 
illicitly compromise the positive liberty externalities of the constitutional 
framework. Judicial intervention, by contrast, should be cautious and 
deferential.  
 
B. Paternalism and Intermural Bargaining  
  
It may seem that the second justification for limiting Coasean-
bargaining—paternalism-warranting internalities—does not translate well to 
the institutional context. Institutions, unlike individuals, do not deploy what 
Daniel Kahneman calls “System 1” heuristics as a shortcut for making 
demanding decisions.331 Institutions comprised of plural natural persons 
instead employ a variety of decision-making processes involving multiple 
stages and many individuals. In doing so, however, they must identify ways 
to overcome paradoxes of aggregation that lead to cycling problems332 and 
                                                 
330 The Court has identified incumbent entrenchment as a concern of constitutional 
dimensions in the campaign finance context. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 
236, 248-49 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
331 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 20–21. 
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overcome collective action hurdles. When they fail to do so, they may 
suffer from ‘internalities’ that can be invoked to justify paternalistic limits 
on institutional bargaining. 
 
It is familiar fare that institutions can suffer from collective 
pathologies that impede rational pursuit of recognized self-interest.333 
Perhaps the most important cleft between institutional interest and 
institutional action here will emerge through failures of collective action. 
Institutions composed of plural members, and whose decisions depend on 
the aggregation of individual members’ preferences, can fail to reach 
outcomes that maximize collective welfare under certain conditions. The 
most important of these is the tragedy of the commons, “in which what is 
best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas 
everyone would have been better off with mutual cooperation.”334 A 
paternalism justification might apply if an institutional entitlement was held 
by a collective in common, for example a group of legislators or a group of 
states, and the collective was routinely unable to overcome its internal 
transaction costs to engage in desirable coordinated action. This might 
result in intermural trading in which the collective ‘sells’ the entitlement on 
the cheap due to its inability to cohere behind a single bargaining position. 
Worse, collective inaction might lead to anomie or wholesale atrophy of an 
entitlement.335  
 
Concerns about collective action ‘internalities’ of this kind might 
hence be a platform for judicial intervention in favor of Congress and 
against the executive branch in the separation of powers context. Congress, 
that is, suffers from a collective-action internality. The legislature is a plural 
entity with higher decision costs than the relatively centralized and 
hierarchical executive. In contrast to the ceaseless churning of biennial and 
sextennial elections, the executive is able to maintain a cadre of long-term 
civil servants and bureaucrats who identify consistently with Article II 
                                                 
333 There are other institutional pathologies with no obvious relevance in this context, such 
as group polarization. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 10-13 (1972). Alternatively, “many 
minds might spin their wheels indefinitely, reaching no single answer or composite 
perspective at all.” Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 20 (2009). This raises the intriguing possibility that the failure to reach an 
intermural deal might warrant an external corrective on paternalist grounds.  
334 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 9 (1980). Alexrod is describing 
the prisoners’ dilemma; the tragedy of the commons is a multiperson prisoners’ dilemma.  
335 See Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 421, 423-25 (2012). 
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aspirations, gather stocks of knowledge necessary to their defense, and 
develop strategic, long-term plans to further that goal.336 For example, the 
Office of Legal Counsel, which furnishes legal opinions on questions of 
constitutional and statutory law raised by executive action, tends to hold a 
“robust conception[n] of presidential power” regardless of party 
affiliation.337 It has also developed a system of stare decisis for its written 
work product338 The result of this institutional asymmetry in collective 
action costs is an imbalance in the branches’ willingness to vindicate their 
respective institutional interests. Moreover, it may well be that judicial 
attention should be more rigorous in periods of unified rather than divided 
government, since when the White House and Congress are in the same 
hands, the temptation to allow institutional interests to slide may be 
especially acute.  
 
This argument is appealing in theory. But it is not clear that courts in 
practice are well situated to make the necessary judgments about 
institutional internalities. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests 
courts tend to compound internalities, not resolve them. Perhaps the most 
forceful argument for a paternalism-based limitation on intermural bargains 
to date has been offered by Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison. 
They persuasively criticize the courts’ longstanding use of interbranch 
custom as a “gloss” on interbranch relations on the ground that “Congress 
as a body does not systematically seek to protect its prerogatives against 
presidential encroachment” due to “collective action problems and veto 
limitations.”339  
 
But whereas Bradley and Morrison’s argument wisely counsels for 
skepticism of historical gloss as a means to narrow legislative and increase 
presidential authority,340 federal courts continue to deploy custom as a way 
to transfer authority from Article I to Article II.341 In so doing, courts 
                                                 
336 Cross-branch partisan links also weaken congressional attachment to institutional 
interests, see Levinson & Pildes, supra note 249, at 2324-25, but might do the same for the 
executive. 
337 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 34 (2007); accord BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 106 (2010). 
338 See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1448, 1457–58 (2010) (concluding that “OLC does not often overrule itself”). 
339 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 103, at 414–15. 
340 Id. at 448–49 (arguing that “where acquiescence is the touchstone of the analysis, the 
standard for legislative acquiescence should be high”). 
341 See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, -- F.3d --, 2013 WL 3799663, at 
*12 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 23, 2013). 
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amplify a distorting imbalance endogenous to the constitutional structure 
rather than ameliorating it. In lieu of resorting to custom when resolving 
interbranch disputes, federal judges may do better by forcing interbranch 
trades to go through bicameralism and presentment, especially if partisan 
linkages and presidential influence on the law-making process addresses the 
risk of legislative hold-outs.  
 
Moreover, to the extent that there is an asymmetry between 
Congress and the executive, it is not clear that the judiciary supplies the best 
remedy. As previously noted, judges tend to hew to their appointing 
president’s views.342 Given how many Article III judges previously worked 
within U.S. Attorneys’ office, this is perhaps no surprise. Rather than 
attempting to reorient the appointment process, Congress may be better 
advised to seek an endogenous solution to its asymmetrical relation to the 
executive. Congress, for example, might seek to create a repository of 
institutional legal opinions to serve as its standard-bearing in interbranch 
battles akin to OLC. Or it might seek to impose more restraints on legal 
interpretation within the executive branch through its appropriations power. 
The precise solution is less important here than the idea that restoring the 
interbranch equilibrium need not involve the federal courts.      
 
In sum, paternalism-warranting internalities may well be a separate 
ground for resisting certain intermural deals, particularly when these are 
reached through incremental and inattentive drift rather than formal 
negotiation. But this does not mean that courts are well positioned to make 
paternalistic judgments about the limits of intermural Coasean bargaining. 
To the contrary, courts have in fact systematically failed to police 
internalities. Once more, this suggests that the existence of limits to 
negotiation between institutions should not be confused with a compelling 
need for judicial enforcement. The framework for assessing institutional 
deals, which comprises a default rule and two exceptions, is better deployed 
in the first instance by officials and their constituents in the course of 
departmentalist and popular judgments about new institutional 
arrangements, with judicial review as a secondary resort.  
Conclusion 
 
Institutional bargains are a persistent aspect of the constitutional 
order. They are inevitable because of both the text’s incomplete 
                                                 
342 See supra text accompanying notes 298 to 299. 
 68 
 
specification of initial entitlements and the tectonic pressures of exogenous 
economic, social, and geopolitical change. Not that this inevitability should 
be bemoaned. Intermural deals are often a desirable means of resolving 
constitutional ambiguities, adapting to changed conditions, and realizing 
new policy goods.  
 
Rather than resisting the inevitable, I have proffered a general 
framework for evaluating the ensuing deals. To that end, I have adapted the 
simple rule deployed in private law analyses of bargaining. As a default 
matter, I suggest, intermural deals reallocating institutional interests should 
be viewed as acceptable in the absence of concerns about either negative 
externalities or paternalism-warranting internalities. Without endeavoring 
any comprehensive accounting of those categories, I have started to sketch 
how they might be operationalized. Rather than relying on courts, which are 
not well-positioned to make judgments about the limits of intermural 
bargains, and which have rendered poor decisions in the separation-of-
powers context previously, I have suggested that the general framework 
developed here should be employed in departmentalist and popular 
judgments of the constitution. Adoption of the framework, when coupled 
with judicial humility, should bring into crisper focus the many and varied 
forms of institutional bargaining that contour, delimit, and enable the 
routine operation of our constitutional dispensation.   
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